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In arXiv:1707.08641, Tim Maudlin claims to construct a counterexample to the result of Proc. Roy. Soc. A vol. 473, iss. 2202, 2017 (arXiv:1607.07871), in which it was shown that no realist model satisfying a certain notion of time-symmetry (in addition to three other assumptions) can reproduce the predictions of quantum theory without retrocausality (influences travelling backwards in time). In this comment, I explain why Maudlins model is not a counterexample because it does not satisfy our time-symmetry assumption. I also explain why Maudlins claim that one of the Lemmas we used in our proof is incorrect is wrong.
The relationship between quantum logic, standard propositional logic, and the (consistent) histories rules for quantum reasoning is discussed. It is shown that Maudlins claim [Am. J. Phys. 79 (2011) 954] that the histories approach is inconsistent, i
The standard formulation of quantum theory assumes a predefined notion of time. This is a major obstacle in the search for a quantum theory of gravity, where the causal structure of space-time is expected to be dynamical and fundamentally probabilist
A recent post by Tim Maudlin to this archive (arXiv:1408.1828) was entitled Reply to Werner. However, it was not clear to what text this was supposed to be a reply. Here I briefly provide this context, and show that Maudlins post is as ill-conceived as the original paper (arXiv:1408.1826).
Invariant Set (IS) theory is a locally causal ontic theory of physics based on the Cosmological Invariant Set postulate that the universe $U$ can be considered a deterministic dynamical system evolving precisely on a (suitably constructed) fractal dy
The only evidence we have for a discrete reality comes from quantum measurements; without invoking these measurements, quantum theory describes continuous entities. This seeming contradiction can be resolved via analysis that treats measurements as b