ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
The relationship between quantum logic, standard propositional logic, and the (consistent) histories rules for quantum reasoning is discussed. It is shown that Maudlins claim [Am. J. Phys. 79 (2011) 954] that the histories approach is inconsistent, is incorrect. The histories approach is both internally consistent and adequate for discussing the physical situations considered by Maudlin.
In arXiv:1707.08641, Tim Maudlin claims to construct a counterexample to the result of Proc. Roy. Soc. A vol. 473, iss. 2202, 2017 (arXiv:1607.07871), in which it was shown that no realist model satisfying a certain notion of time-symmetry (in additi
A recent post by Tim Maudlin to this archive (arXiv:1408.1828) was entitled Reply to Werner. However, it was not clear to what text this was supposed to be a reply. Here I briefly provide this context, and show that Maudlins post is as ill-conceived as the original paper (arXiv:1408.1826).
The decoherence of a two-state tunneling molecule, such as a chiral molecule or ammonia, due to collisions with a buffer gas is analyzed in terms of a succession of quantum states of the molecule satisfying the conditions for a consistent family of h
An example shows that weak decoherence is more restrictive than the minimal logical decoherence structure that allows probabilities to be used consistently for quantum histories. The probabilities in the sum rules that define minimal decoherence are
Although the notion of superdeterminism can, in principle, account for the violation of the Bell inequalities, this potential explanation has been roundly rejected by the quantum foundations community. The arguments for rejection, one of the most sub