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تسجيل مستخدم جديدPrivacy-Preserving Verifiable Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Market Applications
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Jiajun Sun
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Recently, a novel class of incentive mechanisms is proposed to attract extensive users to truthfully participate in crowd sensing applications with a given budget constraint. The class mechanisms also bring good service quality for the requesters in crowd sensing applications. Although it is so important, there still exists many verification and privacy challenges, including users bids and subtask information privacy and identification privacy, winners set privacy of the platform, and the security of the payment outcomes. In this paper, we present a privacy-preserving verifiable incentive mechanism for crowd sensing applications with the budget constraint, not only to explore how to protect the privacies of users and the platform, but also to make the verifiable payment correct between the platform and users for crowd sensing applications. Results indicate that our privacy-preserving verifiable incentive mechanism achieves the same results as the generic one without privacy preservation.
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In crowdsourcing markets, there are two different type jobs, i.e. homogeneous jobs and heterogeneous jobs, which need to be allocated to workers. Incentive mechanisms are essential to attract extensive user participating for achieving good service qu
ality, especially under a given budget constraint condition. To this end, recently, Singer et al. propose a novel class of auction mechanisms for determining near-optimal prices of tasks for crowdsourcing markets constrained by the given budget. Their mechanisms are very useful to motivate extensive user to truthfully participate in crowdsourcing markets. Although they are so important, there still exist many security and privacy challenges in real-life environments. In this paper, we present a general privacy-preserving verifiable incentive mechanism for crowdsourcing markets with the budget constraint, not only to exploit how to protect the bids and assignments privacy, and the chosen winners privacy in crowdsourcing markets with homogeneous jobs and heterogeneous jobs and identity privacy from users, but also to make the verifiable payment between the platform and users for crowdsourcing applications. Results show that our general privacy-preserving verifiable incentive mechanisms achieve the same results as the generic one without privacy preservation.
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