Off-chain protocols constitute one of the most promising approaches to solve the inherent scalability issue of blockchain technologies. The core idea is to let parties transact on-chain only once to establish a channel between them, leveraging later
on the resulting channel paths to perform arbitrarily many peer-to-peer transactions off-chain. While significant progress has been made in terms of proof techniques for off-chain protocols, existing approaches do not capture the game-theoretic incentives at the core of their design, which led to overlooking significant attack vectors like the Wormhole attack in the past. This work introduces the first game-theoretic model that is expressive enough to reason about the security of off-chain protocols. We advocate the use of Extensive Form Games - EFGs and introduce two instances of EFGs to capture security properties of the closing and the routing of the Lightning Network. Specifically, we model the closing protocol, which relies on punishment mechanisms to disincentivize the uploading on-chain of old channel states, as well as the routing protocol, thereby formally characterizing the Wormhole attack, a vulnerability that undermines the fee-based incentive mechanism underlying the Lightning Network.
We introduce FnF-BFT, a parallel-leader byzantine fault-tolerant state-machine replication protocol for the partially synchronous model with theoretical performance bounds during synchrony. By allowing all replicas to act as leaders and propose reque
sts independently, FnF-BFT parallelizes the execution of requests. Leader parallelization distributes the load over the entire network -- increasing throughput by overcoming the single-leader bottleneck. We further use historical data to ensure that well-performing replicas are in command. FnF-BFTs communication complexity is linear in the number of replicas during synchrony and thus competitive with state-of-the-art protocols. Finally, with FnF-BFT, we introduce a BFT protocol with performance guarantees in stable network conditions under truly byzantine attacks. A prototype implementation of prot outperforms (state-of-the-art) HotStuffs throughput, especially as replicas increase, showcasing prots significantly improved scaling capabilities.
Payment channels were introduced to solve various eminent cryptocurrency scalability issues. Multiple payment channels build a network on top of a blockchain, the so-called layer 2. In this work, we analyze payment networks through the lens of networ
k creation games. We identify betweenness and closeness centrality as central concepts regarding payment networks. We study the topologies that emerge when players act selfishly and determine the parameter space in which they constitute a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we determine the social optima depending on the correlation of betweenness and closeness centrality. When possible, we bound the price of anarchy. We also briefly discuss the price of stability.
