Internet of Things (IoT) devices and applications can have significant vulnerabilities, which may be exploited by adversaries to cause considerable harm. An important approach for mitigating this threat is remote attestation, which enables the defend
er to remotely verify the integrity of devices and their software. There are a number of approaches for remote attestation, and each has its unique advantages and disadvantages in terms of detection accuracy and computational cost. Further, an attestation method may be applied in multiple ways, such as various levels of software coverage. Therefore, to minimize both security risks and computational overhead, defenders need to decide strategically which attestation methods to apply and how to apply them, depending on the characteristic of the devices and the potential losses. To answer these questions, we first develop a testbed for remote attestation of IoT devices, which enables us to measure the detection accuracy and performance overhead of various attestation methods. Our testbed integrates two example IoT applications, memory-checksum based attestation, and a variety of software vulnerabilities that allow adversaries to inject arbitrary code into running applications. Second, we model the problem of finding an optimal strategy for applying remote attestation as a Stackelberg security game between a defender and an adversary. We characterize the defenders optimal attestation strategy in a variety of special cases. Finally, building on experimental results from our testbed, we evaluate our model and show that optimal strategic attestation can lead to significantly lower losses than naive baseline strategies.
We study the problem of defending deep neural network approaches for image classification from physically realizable attacks. First, we demonstrate that the two most scalable and effective methods for learning robust models, adversarial training with
PGD attacks and randomized smoothing, exhibit very limited effectiveness against three of the highest profile physical attacks. Next, we propose a new abstract adversarial model, rectangular occlusion attacks, in which an adversary places a small adversarially crafted rectangle in an image, and develop two approaches for efficiently computing the resulting adversarial examples. Finally, we demonstrate that adversarial training using our new attack yields image classification models that exhibit high robustness against the physically realizable attacks we study, offering the first effective generic defense against such attacks.
Stackelberg security game models and associated computational tools have seen deployment in a number of high-consequence security settings, such as LAX canine patrols and Federal Air Marshal Service. These models focus on isolated systems with only o
ne defender, despite being part of a more complex system with multiple players. Furthermore, many real systems such as transportation networks and the power grid exhibit interdependencies between targets and, consequently, between decision makers jointly charged with protecting them. To understand such multidefender strategic interactions present in security, we investigate game theoretic models of security games with multiple defenders. Unlike most prior analysis, we focus on the situations in which each defender must protect multiple targets, so that even a single defenders best response decision is, in general, highly non-trivial. We start with an analytical investigation of multidefender security games with independent targets, offering an equilibrium and price-of-anarchy analysis of three models with increasing generality. In all models, we find that defenders have the incentive to over-protect targets, at times significantly. Additionally, in the simpler models, we find that the price of anarchy is unbounded, linearly increasing both in the number of defenders and the number of targets per defender. Considering interdependencies among targets, we develop a novel mixed-integer linear programming formulation to compute a defenders best response, and make use of this formulation in approximating Nash equilibria of the game. We apply this approach towards computational strategic analysis of several models of networks representing interdependencies, including real-world power networks. Our analysis shows how network structure and the probability of failure spread determine the propensity of defenders to over- or under-invest in security.
We present a characterization of short-term stability of random Boolean networks under emph{arbitrary} distributions of transfer functions. Given any distribution of transfer functions for a random Boolean network, we present a formula that decides w
hether short-term chaos (damage spreading) will happen. We provide a formal proof for this formula, and empirically show that its predictions are accurate. Previous work only works for special cases of balanced families. It has been observed that these characterizations fail for unbalanced families, yet such families are widespread in real biological networks.
