Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such settings, form
ing preferences is both difficult and critical. Prior work has suggested various prediction mechanisms that help agents make decisions about their preferences. Although often deployed together, these matching and prediction mechanisms are almost always analyzed separately. The present work shows that at the intersection of the two lies a previously unexplored type of strategic behavior: agents returning to the market (e.g., schools) can attack future predictions by interacting short-term non-optimally with their matches. Here, we first introduce this type of strategic behavior, which we call an `adversarial interaction attack. Next, we construct a formal economic model that captures the feedback loop between prediction mechanisms designed to assist agents and the matching mechanism used to pair them. This economic model allows us to analyze adversarial interaction attacks. Finally, using school choice as an example, we build a simulation to show that, as the trust in and accuracy of predictions increases, schools gain progressively more by initiating an adversarial interaction attack. We also show that this attack increases inequality in the student population.
Perhaps the most controversial questions in the study of online platforms today surround the extent to which platforms can intervene to reduce the societal ills perpetrated on them. Up for debate is whether there exist any effective and lasting inter
ventions a platform can adopt to address, e.g., online bullying, or if other, more far-reaching change is necessary to address such problems. Empirical work is critical to addressing such questions. But it is also challenging, because it is time-consuming, expensive, and sometimes limited to the questions companies are willing to ask. To help focus and inform this empirical work, we here propose an agent-based modeling (ABM) approach. As an application, we analyze the impact of a set of interventions on a simulated online dating platform on the lack of long-term interracial relationships in an artificial society. In the real world, a lack of interracial relationships are a critical vehicle through which inequality is maintained. Our work shows that many previously hypothesized interventions online dating platforms could take to increase the number of interracial relationships from their website have limited effects, and that the effectiveness of any intervention is subject to assumptions about sociocultural structure. Further, interventions that are effective in increasing diversity in long-term relationships are at odds with platforms profit-oriented goals. At a general level, the present work shows the value of using an ABM approach to help understand the potential effects and side effects of different interventions that a platform could take.
