Learning What Others Know

We propose a number of powerful dynamic-epistemic logics for multi-agent information sharing and acts of publicly or privately accessing other agents information databases. The static base of our logics is obtained by adding to standard epistemic logic comparative epistemic assertions, that can express epistemic superiority between groups or individuals, as well as a common distributed knowledge operator (that combines features of both common knowledge and distributed knowledge). On the dynamic side, we introduce actions by which epistemic superiority can be acquired: sharing all one knows (by e.g. giving access to ones information database to all or some of the other agents), as well as more complex informational events, such as hacking. We completely axiomatize several such logics and prove their decidability.

The Logic of Quantum Programs

We present a logical calculus for reasoning about information flow in quantum programs. In particular we introduce a dynamic logic that is capable of dealing with quantum measurements, unitary evolutions and entanglements in compound quantum systems. We give a syntax and a relational semantics in which we abstract away from phases and probabilities. We present a sound proof system for this logic, and we show how to characterize by logical means various forms of entanglement (e.g. the Bell states) and various linear operators. As an example we sketch an analysis of the teleportation protocol.

Argument-based Belief in Topological Structures

This paper combines two studies: a topological semantics for epistemic notions and abstract argumentation theory. In our combined setting, we use a topological semantics to represent the structure of an agents collection of evidence, and we use argumentation theory to single out the relevant sets of evidence through which a notion of beliefs grounded on arguments is defined. We discuss the formal properties of this newly defined notion, providing also a formal language with a matching modality together with a sound and complete axiom system for it. Despite the fact that our agent can combine her evidence in a rational way (captured via the topological structure), argument-based beliefs are not closed under conjunction. This illustrates the difference between an agents reasoning abilities (i.e. the way she is able to combine her available evidence) and the closure properties of her beliefs. We use this point to argue for why the failure of closure under conjunction of belief should not bear the burden of the failure of rationality.