Providing compact and understandable counterexamples for violated system properties is an essential task in model checking. Existing works on counterexamples for probabilistic systems so far computed either a large set of system runs or a subset of t
he systems states, both of which are of limited use in manual debugging. Many probabilistic systems are described in a guarded command language like the one used by the popular model checker PRISM. In this paper we describe how a smallest possible subset of the commands can be identified which together make the system erroneous. We additionally show how the selected commands can be further simplified to obtain a well-understandable counterexample.
We are interested in the analysis of very large continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs) with many distinct rates. Such models arise naturally in the context of reliability analysis, e.g., of computer network performability analysis, of power grids, of
computer virus vulnerability, and in the study of crowd dynamics. We use abstraction techniques together with novel algorithms for the computation of bounds on the expected final and accumulated rewards in continuous-time Markov decision processes (CTMDPs). These ingredients are combined in a partly symbolic and partly explicit (symblicit) analysis approach. In particular, we circumvent the use of multi-terminal decision diagrams, because the latter do not work well if facing a large number of different rates. We demonstrate the practical applicability and efficiency of the approach on two case studies.
