With the development of intelligent vehicles, security and reliability communication between vehicles has become a key problem to be solved in Internet of vehicles(IoVs). Blockchain is considered as a feasible solution due to its advantages of decent
ralization, unforgeability and collective maintenance. However, the computing power of nodes in IoVs is limited, while the consensus mechanism of blockchain requires that the miners in the system have strong computing power for mining calculation. It consequently cannot satisfy the requirements, which is the challenges for the application of blockchain in IoVs. In fact, the application of blockchain in IoVs can be implemented by employing edge computing. The key entity of edge computing is the edge servers(ESs). Roadside nodes(RSUs) can be deployed as ESs of edge computing in IoVs. We have studied the ES deployment scheme for covering more vehicle nodes in IoVs, and propose a randomized algorithm to calculate approximation solutions. Finally, we simulated the performance of the proposed scheme and compared it with other deployment schemes.
Mining in the blockchain requires high computing power to solve the hash puzzle for example proof-of-work puzzle. It takes high cost to achieve the calculation of this problem in devices of IOT, especially the mobile devices of IOT. It consequently r
estricts the application of blockchain in mobile environment. However, edge computing can be utilized to solve the problem for insufficient computing power of mobile devices in IOT. Edge servers can recruit many mobile devices to contribute computing power together to mining and share the reward of mining with these recruited mobile devices. In this paper, we propose an incentivizing mechanism based on edge computing for mobile blockchain. We design a two-stage Stackelberg Game to jointly optimize the reward of edge servers and recruited mobile devices. The edge server as the leader sets the expected fee for the recruited mobile devices in Stage I. The mobile device as a follower provides its computing power to mine according to the expected fee in Stage. It proves that this game can obtain a uniqueness Nash Equilibrium solution under the same or different expected fee. In the simulation experiment, we obtain a result curve of the profit for the edge server with the different ratio between the computing power from the edge server and mobile devices. In addition, the proposed scheme has been compared with the MDG scheme for the profit of the edge server. The experimental results show that the profit of the proposed scheme is more than that of the MDG scheme under the same total computing power.
