Optimum decision fusion in the presence of malicious nodes - often referred to as Byzantines - is hindered by the necessity of exactly knowing the statistical behavior of Byzantines. By focusing on a simple, yet widely studied, set-up in which a Fusi
on Center (FC) is asked to make a binary decision about a sequence of system states by relying on the possibly corrupted decisions provided by local nodes, we propose a game-theoretic framework which permits to exploit the superior performance provided by optimum decision fusion, while limiting the amount of a-priori knowledge required. We first derive the optimum decision strategy by assuming that the statistical behavior of the Byzantines is known. Then we relax such an assumption by casting the problem into a game-theoretic framework in which the FC tries to guess the behavior of the Byzantines, which, in turn, must fix their corruption strategy without knowing the guess made by the FC. We use numerical simulations to derive the equilibrium of the game, thus identifying the optimum behavior for both the FC and the Byzantines, and to evaluate the achievable performance at the equilibrium. We analyze several different setups, showing that in all cases the proposed solution permits to improve the accuracy of data fusion. We also show that, in some instances, it is preferable for the Byzantines to minimize the mutual information between the status of the observed system and the reports submitted to the FC, rather than always flipping the decision made by the local nodes as it is customarily assumed in previous works.
The most common approach to mitigate the impact that the presence of malicious nodes has on the accuracy of decision fusion schemes consists in observing the behavior of the nodes over a time interval T and then removing the reports of suspect nodes
from the fusion process. By assuming that some a-priori information about the presence of malicious nodes and their behavior is available, we show that the information stemming from the suspect nodes can be exploited to further improve the decision fusion accuracy. Specifically, we derive the optimum fusion rule and analyze the achievable performance for two specific cases. In the first case, the states of the nodes (corrupted or honest) are independent of each other and the fusion center knows only the probability that a node is malicious. In the second case, the exact number of corrupted nodes is fixed and known to the fusion center. We also investigate the optimum corruption strategy for the malicious nodes, showing that always reverting the local decision does not necessarily maximize the loss of performance at the fusion center.
