In this paper we provide a valuation formula for different classes of actuarial and financial contracts which depend on a general loss process, by using the Malliavin calculus. In analogy with the celebrated Black-Scholes formula, we aim at expressin
g the expected cash flow in terms of a building block. The former is related to the loss process which is a cumulated sum indexed by a doubly stochastic Poisson process of claims allowed to be dependent on the intensity and the jump times of the counting process. For example, in the context of Stop-Loss contracts the building block is given by the distribution function of the terminal cumulated loss, taken at the Value at Risk when computing the Expected Shortfall risk measure.
The purpose of this paper relies on the study of long term yield curves modeling. Inspired by the economic litterature, it provides a financial interpretation of the Ramsey rule that links discount rate and marginal utility of aggregate optimal consu
mption. For such a long maturity modelization, the possibility of adjusting preferences to new economic information is crucial. Thus, after recalling some important properties on progressive utility, this paper first provides an extension of the notion of a consistent progressive utility to a consistent pair of progressive utilities of investment and consumption. An optimality condition is that the utility from the wealth satisfies a second order SPDE of HJB type involving the Fenchel-Legendre transform of the utility from consumption. This SPDE is solved in order to give a full characterization of this class of consistent progressive pair of utilities. An application of this results is to revisit the classical backward optimization problem in the light of progressive utility theory, emphasizing intertemporal-consistency issue. Then we study the dynamics of the marginal utility yield curve, and give example with backward and progressive power utilities.
We deal with the problem of outsourcing the debt for a big investment, according two situations: either the firm outsources both the investment (and the associated debt) and the exploitation to a private consortium, or the firm supports the debt and
the investment but outsources the exploitation. We prove the existence of Stackelberg and Nash equilibria between the firm and the private consortium, in both situations. We compare the benefits of these contracts. We conclude with a study of what happens in case of incomplete information, in the sense that the risk aversion coefficient of each partner may be unknown by the other partner.
