Should the democrats move to the left on economic policy?

Could John Kerry have gained votes in the 2004 Presidential election by more clearly distinguishing himself from George Bush on economic policy? At first thought, the logic of political preferences would suggest not: the Republicans are to the right of most Americans on economic policy, and so in a one-dimensional space with party positions measured with no error, the optimal strategy for the Democrats would be to stand infinitesimally to the left of the Republicans. The median voter theorem suggests that each party should keep its policy positions just barely distinguishable from the opposition. In a multidimensional setting, however, or when voters vary in their perceptions of the parties positions, a party can benefit from putting some daylight between itself and the other party on an issue where it has a public-opinion advantage (such as economic policy for the Democrats). We set up a plausible theoretical model in which the Democrats could achieve a net gain in votes by moving to the left on economic policy, given the parties positions on a range of issue dimensions. We then evaluate this model based on survey data on voters perceptions of their own positions and those of the candidates in 2004. Under our model, it turns out to be optimal for the Democrats to move slightly to the right but staying clearly to the left of the Republicans current position on economic issues.

Inherent Difficulties of Non-Bayesian Likelihood-based Inference, as Revealed by an Examination of a Recent Book by Aitkin

For many decades, statisticians have made attempts to prepare the Bayesian omelette without breaking the Bayesian eggs; that is, to obtain probabilistic likelihood-based inferences without relying on informative prior distributions. A recent example is Murray Aitkins recent book, {em Statistical Inference}, which presents an approach to statistical hypothesis testing based on comparisons of posterior distributions of likelihoods under competing models. Aitkin develops and illustrates his method using some simple examples of inference from iid data and two-way tests of independence. We analyze in this note some consequences of the inferential paradigm adopted therein, discussing why the approach is incompatible with a Bayesian perspective and why we do not find it relevant for applied work.

Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics

A substantial school in the philosophy of science identifies Bayesian inference with inductive inference and even rationality as such, and seems to be strengthened by the rise and practical success of Bayesian statistics. We argue that the most successful forms of Bayesian statistics do not actually support that particular philosophy but rather accord much better with sophisticated forms of hypothetico-deductivism. We examine the actual role played by prior distributions in Bayesian models, and the crucial aspects of model checking and model revision, which fall outside the scope of Bayesian confirmation theory. We draw on the literature on the consistency of Bayesian updating and also on our experience of applied work in social science. Clarity about these matters should benefit not just philosophy of science, but also statistical practice. At best, the inductivist view has encouraged researchers to fit and compare models without checking them; at worst, theorists have actively discouraged practitioners from performing model checking because it does not fit into their framework.