The Kish key distribution system has been proposed as a class ical alternative to quantum key distribution. The idealized Kish scheme elegantly promise s secure key distribution by exploiting thermal noise in a transmission line. However, we demonstr
ate that it is vulnerable to nonidealities in its components, such as the finite resistance of the transmission line connecting its endpoints. We introduce a novel attack against this nonideality using directional wave measurements, and experimentally demonstrate its efficacy. Our attack is based on causality: in a spatially distributed system, propagation is needed for thermodynamic equilibration, and that leaks information.
While information-theoretic security is often associated with the one-time pad and quantum key distribution, noisy transport media leave room for classical techniques and even covert operation. Transit times across the public internet exhibit a degre
e of randomness, and cannot be determined noiselessly by an eavesdropper. We demonstrate the use of these measurements for information-theoretically secure communication over the public internet.
