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We provide a novel perspective on regularity as a property of representations of the Weyl algebra. In Part I, we critiqued a proposal by Halvorson [2004, Complementarity of representations in quantum mechanics, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35(1), pp. 45--56], who advocates for the use of the non-regular position and momentum representations of the Weyl algebra. Halvorson argues that the existence of these non-regular representations demonstrates that a quantum mechanical particle can have definite values for position or momentum, contrary to a widespread view. In this sequel, we propose a justification for focusing on regular representations, pace Halvorson, by drawing on algebraic methods.
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We provide a novel perspective on regularity as a property of representations of the Weyl algebra. We first critique a proposal by Halvorson [2004, Complementarity of representations in quantum mechanics, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35(1), pp. 45--56], who argues that the non-regular position and momentum representations of the Weyl algebra demonstrate that a quantum mechanical particle can have definite values for position or momentum, contrary to a widespread view. We show that there are obstacles to such an intepretation of non-regular representations. In Part II, we propose a justification for focusing on regular representations, pace Halvorson, by drawing on algebraic methods.
Randomness is an unavoidable notion in discussing quantum physics, and this may trigger the curiosity to know more of its cultural history. This text is an invitation to explore the position on the matter of Thomas Aquinas, one of the most prominent philosophers and theologians of the European Middle Ages.
Sommerfeld called the first part of the second law to be the entropy axiom, which is about the existence of the state function entropy. It was usually thought that the second part of the second law, which is about the non-decreasing nature of entropy of thermally isolated systems, did not follow from the first part. In this note, we point out the surprise that the first part in fact implies the second part.
In 1717 Halley compared contemporaneous measurements of the latitudes of four stars with earlier measurements by ancient Greek astronomers and by Brahe, and from the differences concluded that these four stars showed proper motion. An analysis with modern methods shows that the data used by Halley do not contain significant evidence for proper motion. What Halley found are the measurement errors of Ptolemaios and Brahe. Halley further argued that the occultation of Aldebaran by the Moon on 11 March 509 in Athens confirmed the change in latitude of Aldebaran. In fact, however, the relevant observation was almost certainly made in Alexandria where Aldebaran was not occulted. By carefully considering measurement errors Jacques Cassini showed that Halleys results from comparison with earlier astronomers were spurious, a conclusion partially confirmed by various later authors. Cassinis careful study of the measurements of the latitude of Arcturus provides the first significant evidence for proper motion.
In recent years philosophers of science have explored categorical equivalence as a promising criterion for when two (physical) theories are equivalent. On the one hand, philosophers have presented several examples of theories whose relationships seem to be clarified using these categorical methods. On the other hand, philosophers and logicians have studied the relationships, particularly in the first order case, between categorical equivalence and other notions of equivalence of theories, including definitional equivalence and generalized definitional (aka Morita) equivalence. In this article, I will express some skepticism about this approach, both on technical grounds and conceptual ones. I will argue that category structure (alone) likely does not capture the structure of a theory, and discuss some recent work in light of this claim.
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