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James Owen Weatherall
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In recent years philosophers of science have explored categorical equivalence as a promising criterion for when two (physical) theories are equivalent. On the one hand, philosophers have presented several examples of theories whose relationships seem to be clarified using these categorical methods. On the other hand, philosophers and logicians have studied the relationships, particularly in the first order case, between categorical equivalence and other notions of equivalence of theories, including definitional equivalence and generalized definitional (aka Morita) equivalence. In this article, I will express some skepticism about this approach, both on technical grounds and conceptual ones. I will argue that category structure (alone) likely does not capture the structure of a theory, and discuss some recent work in light of this claim.
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In 1717 Halley compared contemporaneous measurements of the latitudes of four stars with earlier measurements by ancient Greek astronomers and by Brahe, and from the differences concluded that these four stars showed proper motion. An analysis with modern methods shows that the data used by Halley do not contain significant evidence for proper motion. What Halley found are the measurement errors of Ptolemaios and Brahe. Halley further argued that the occultation of Aldebaran by the Moon on 11 March 509 in Athens confirmed the change in latitude of Aldebaran. In fact, however, the relevant observation was almost certainly made in Alexandria where Aldebaran was not occulted. By carefully considering measurement errors Jacques Cassini showed that Halleys results from comparison with earlier astronomers were spurious, a conclusion partially confirmed by various later authors. Cassinis careful study of the measurements of the latitude of Arcturus provides the first significant evidence for proper motion.
In this article we review how categorical equivalences are realized by renormalization group flow in physical realizations of stacks, derived categories, and derived schemes. We begin by reviewing the physical realization of sigma models on stacks, as (universality classes of) gauged sigma models, and look in particular at properties of sigma models on gerbes (equivalently, sigma models with restrictions on nonperturbative sectors), and decomposition, in which two-dimensional sigma models on gerbes decompose into disjoint unions of ordinary theories. We also discuss stack structures on examples of moduli spaces of SCFTs, focusing on elliptic curves, and implications of subtleties there for string dualities in other dimensions. In the second part of this article, we review the physical realization of derived categories in terms of renormalization group flow (time evolution) of combinations of D-branes, antibranes, and tachyons. In the third part of this article, we review how Landau-Ginzburg models provide a physical realization of derived schemes, and also outline an example of a derived structure on a moduli spaces of SCFTs.
We provide a novel perspective on regularity as a property of representations of the Weyl algebra. In Part I, we critiqued a proposal by Halvorson [2004, Complementarity of representations in quantum mechanics, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35(1), pp. 45--56], who advocates for the use of the non-regular position and momentum representations of the Weyl algebra. Halvorson argues that the existence of these non-regular representations demonstrates that a quantum mechanical particle can have definite values for position or momentum, contrary to a widespread view. In this sequel, we propose a justification for focusing on regular representations, pace Halvorson, by drawing on algebraic methods.
We provide a novel perspective on regularity as a property of representations of the Weyl algebra. We first critique a proposal by Halvorson [2004, Complementarity of representations in quantum mechanics, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35(1), pp. 45--56], who argues that the non-regular position and momentum representations of the Weyl algebra demonstrate that a quantum mechanical particle can have definite values for position or momentum, contrary to a widespread view. We show that there are obstacles to such an intepretation of non-regular representations. In Part II, we propose a justification for focusing on regular representations, pace Halvorson, by drawing on algebraic methods.
I review the philosophical literature on the question of when two physical theories are equivalent. This includes a discussion of empirical equivalence, which is often taken to be necessary, and sometimes taken to be sufficient, for theoretical equivalence; and interpretational equivalence, which is the idea that two theories are equivalent just in case they have the same interpretation. It also includes a discussion of several formal notions of equivalence that have been considered in the recent philosophical literature, including (generalized) definitional equivalence and categorical equivalence. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the relationship between equivalence and duality.
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