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Register a new userA posteriori probabilistic feasibility guarantees for Nash equilibria in uncertain multi-agent games
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In this paper a distribution-free methodology is presented for providing robustness guarantees for Nash equilibria (NE) of multi-agent games. Leveraging recent a posteriori developments of the so called scenario approach (Campi et al., 2018), we provide probabilistic guarantees for feasibility problems with polytopic constraints. This result is then used in the context of multi-agent games, allowing to provide robustness certificates for constraint violation of any NE of a given game. Our guarantees can be used alongside any NE seeking algorithm that returns some equilibrium solution. Finally, by exploiting the structure of our problem, we circumvent the need of employing computationally prohibitive algorithms to find an irreducible support subsample, a concept at the core of the scenario approach. Our theoretical results are accompanied by simulation studies that investigate the robustness of the solutions of two different problems, namely, a 2-dimensional feasibility problem and an electric vehicle (EV) charging control problem.
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We develop a data-driven approach to the computation of a-posteriori feasibility certificates to the solution sets of variational inequalities affected by uncertainty. Specifically, we focus on instances of variational inequalities with a deterministic mapping and an uncertain feasibility set, and represent uncertainty by means of scenarios. Building upon recent advances in the scenario approach literature, we quantify the robustness properties of the entire set of solutions of a variational inequality, with feasibility set constructed using the scenario approach, against a new unseen realization of the uncertainty. Our results extend existing results that typically impose an assumption that the solution set is a singleton and require certain non-degeneracy properties, and thereby offer probabilistic feasibility guarantees to any feasible solution. We show that assessing the violation probability of an entire set of solutions, rather than of a singleton, requires enumeration of the support constraints that shape this set. Additionally, we propose a general procedure to enumerate the support constraints that does not require a closed form description of the solution set, which is unlikely to be available. We show that robust game theory problems can be modelling via uncertain variational inequalities, and illustrate our theoretical results through extensive numerical simulations on a case study involving an electric vehicle charging coordination problem.
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We investigate the probabilistic feasibility of randomized solutions to two distinct classes of uncertain multi-agent optimization programs. We first assume that only the constraints of the program are affected by uncertainty, while the cost function is arbitrary. Leveraging recent a posteriori developments of the scenario approach, we provide probabilistic guarantees for all feasible solutions of the program under study. This result is particularly useful in cases where numerical difficulties related to the convergence of the solution-seeking algorithm hinder the exact quantification of the optimal solution. Furthermore, it can be applied to cases where the agents incentives lead to a suboptimal solution, e.g., under a non-cooperative setting. We then focus on optimization programs where the cost function admits an aggregate representation and depends on uncertainty while constraints are deterministic. By exploiting the structure of the program under study and leveraging the so called support rank notion, we provide agent-independent robustness certificates for the optimal solution, i.e., the constructed bound on the probability of constraint violation does not depend on the number of agents, but only on the dimension of the agents decision. This substantially reduces the number of samples required to achieve a certain level of probabilistic robustness as the number of agents increases. All robustness certificates provided in this paper are distribution-free and can be used alongside any optimization algorithm. Our theoretical results are accompanied by a numerical case study involving a charging control problem of a fleet of electric vehicles.
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