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Register a new userThe paradox of monotone structural QRE
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McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)s monotone structural Quantal Response Equilibrium theory may be misspecified for the study of monotone behavior.
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A decision maker (DM) determines a set of reactions that receivers can choose before senders and receivers move in a generalized competitive signaling model with two-sided matching. The DMs optimal design of the unique stronger monotone signaling equilibrium (unique D1 equilibrium) is equivalent to the choice problem of two threshold sender types, one for market entry and the other for pooling on the top. Our analysis sheds light on the impacts of a trade-off between matching efficiency and signaling costs, the relative heterogeneity of receiver types to sender types, and the productivity of the senders action on optimal equilibrium designing.
The EPR paradox and the meaning of the Bell inequality are discussed. It is shown that considering the quantum objects as carrying with them instruction kits telling them what to do when meeting a measurement apparatus any paradox disappears. In this view the quantum state is characterized by the prescribed behaviour rather than by the specific value a parameter assumes as a result of an interaction.
Volume and enthalpy relaxation of glasses after a sudden temperature change has been extensively studied since Kovacs seminal work. One observes an asymmetric approach to equilibrium upon cooling versus heating and, more counter-intuitively, the expansion gap paradox, i.e. a dependence on the initial temperature of the effective relaxation time even close to equilibrium when heating. Here we show that a distinguishable-particles lattice model can capture both the asymmetry and the expansion gap. We quantitatively characterize the energetic states of the particles configurations using a physical realization of the fictive temperature called the structural temperature, which, in the heating case, displays a strong spatial heterogeneity. The system relaxes by nucleation and expansion of warmer mobile domains having attained the final temperature, against cooler immobile domains maintained at the initial temperature. A small population of these cooler regions persists close to equilibrium, thus explaining the paradox.
This note provides a critical discussion of the textit{Critical Cost-Efficiency Index} (CCEI) as used to assess deviations from utility-maximizing behavior. I argue that the CCEI is hard to interpret, and that it can disagree with other plausible measures of irrational behavior. The common interpretation of CCEI as wasted income is questionable. Moreover, I show that one agent may have more unstable preferences than another, but seem more rational according to the CCEI. This calls into question the (now common) use of CCEI as an ordinal and cardinal measure of degrees of rationality.
We introduce a general Hamiltonian framework that appears to be a natural setting for the derivation of various production functions in economic growth theory, starting with the celebrated Cobb-Douglas function. Employing our method, we investigate some existing models and propose a new one as special cases of the general $n$-dimensional Lotka-Volterra system of eco-dynamics.
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