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Register a new userUnderstanding Membership Inferences on Well-Generalized Learning Models
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Yunhui Long
Publication date
2018
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Membership Inference Attack (MIA) determines the presence of a record in a machine learning models training data by querying the model. Prior work has shown that the attack is feasible when the model is overfitted to its training data or when the adversary controls the training algorithm. However, when the model is not overfitted and the adversary does not control the training algorithm, the threat is not well understood. In this paper, we report a study that discovers overfitting to be a sufficient but not a necessary condition for an MIA to succeed. More specifically, we demonstrate that even a well-generalized model contains vulnerable instances subject to a new generalized MIA (GMIA). In GMIA, we use novel techniques for selecting vulnerable instances and detecting their subtle influences ignored by overfitting metrics. Specifically, we successfully identify individual records with high precision in real-world datasets by querying black-box machine learning models. Further we show that a vulnerable record can even be indirectly attacked by querying other related records and existing generalization techniques are found to be less effective in protecting the vulnerable instances. Our findings sharpen the understanding of the fundamental cause of the problem: the unique influences the training instance may have on the model.
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Membership inference attacks seek to infer the membership of individual training instances of a privately trained model. This paper presents a membership privacy analysis and evaluation system, called MPLens, with three unique contributions. First, through MPLens, we demonstrate how membership inference attack methods can be leveraged in adversarial machine learning. Second, through MPLens, we highlight how the vulnerability of pre-trained models under membership inference attack is not uniform across all classes, particularly when the training data itself is skewed. We show that risk from membership inference attacks is routinely increased when models use skewed training data. Finally, we investigate the effectiveness of differential privacy as a mitigation technique against membership inference attacks. We discuss the trade-offs of implementing such a mitigation strategy with respect to the model complexity, the learning task complexity, the dataset complexity and the privacy parameter settings. Our empirical results reveal that (1) minority groups within skewed datasets display increased risk for membership inference and (2) differential privacy presents many challenging trade-offs as a mitigation technique to membership inference risk.
In this work, we formally study the membership privacy risk of generative models and propose a membership privacy estimation framework. We formulate the membership privacy risk as a statistical divergence between training samples and hold-out samples, and propose sample-based methods to estimate this divergence. Unlike previous works, our proposed metric and estimators make realistic and flexible assumptions. First, we offer a generalizable metric as an alternative to accuracy for imbalanced datasets. Second, our estimators are capable of estimating the membership privacy risk given any scalar or vector valued attributes from the learned model, while prior work require access to specific attributes. This allows our framework to provide data-driven certificates for trained generative models in terms of membership privacy risk. Finally, we show a connection to differential privacy, which allows our proposed estimators to be used to understand the privacy budget epsilon needed for differentially private generative models. We demonstrate the utility of our framework through experimental demonstrations on different generative models using various model attributes yielding some new insights about membership leakage and vulnerabilities of models.
Interpretability of learning-to-rank models is a crucial yet relatively under-examined research area. Recent progress on interpretable ranking models largely focuses on generating post-hoc explanations for existing black-box ranking models, whereas the alternative option of building an intrinsically interpretable ranking model with transparent and self-explainable structure remains unexplored. Developing fully-understandable ranking models is necessary in some scenarios (e.g., due to legal or policy constraints) where post-hoc methods cannot provide sufficiently accurate explanations. In this paper, we lay the groundwork for intrinsically interpretable learning-to-rank by introducing generalized additive models (GAMs) into ranking tasks. Generalized additive models (GAMs) are intrinsically interpretable machine learning models and have been extensively studied on regression and classification tasks. We study how to extend GAMs into ranking models which can handle both item-level and list-level features and propose a novel formulation of ranking GAMs. To instantiate ranking GAMs, we employ neural networks instead of traditional splines or regression trees. We also show that our neural ranking GAMs can be distilled into a set of simple and compact piece-wise linear functions that are much more efficient to evaluate with little accuracy loss. We conduct experiments on three data sets and show that our proposed neural ranking GAMs can achieve significantly better performance than other traditional GAM baselines while maintaining similar interpretability.
Deep Learning has recently become hugely popular in machine learning, providing significant improvements in classification accuracy in the presence of highly-structured and large databases. Researchers have also considered privacy implications of deep learning. Models are typically trained in a centralized manner with all the data being processed by the same training algorithm. If the data is a collection of users private data, including habits, personal pictures, geographical positions, interests, and more, the centralized server will have access to sensitive information that could potentially be mishandled. To tackle this problem, collaborative deep learning models have recently been proposed where parties locally train their deep learning structures and only share a subset of the parameters in the attempt to keep their respective training sets private. Parameters can also be obfuscated via differential privacy (DP) to make information extraction even more challenging, as proposed by Shokri and Shmatikov at CCS15. Unfortunately, we show that any privacy-preserving collaborative deep learning is susceptible to a powerful attack that we devise in this paper. In particular, we show that a distributed, federated, or decentralized deep learning approach is fundamentally broken and does not protect the training sets of honest participants. The attack we developed exploits the real-time nature of the learning process that allows the adversary to train a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) that generates prototypical samples of the targeted training set that was meant to be private (the samples generated by the GAN are intended to come from the same distribution as the training data). Interestingly, we show that record-level DP applied to the shared parameters of the model, as suggested in previous work, is ineffective (i.e., record-level DP is not designed to address our attack).
Recently, recommender systems have achieved promising performances and become one of the most widely used web applications. However, recommender systems are often trained on highly sensitive user data, thus potential data leakage from recommender systems may lead to severe privacy problems. In this paper, we make the first attempt on quantifying the privacy leakage of recommender systems through the lens of membership inference. In contrast with traditional membership inference against machine learning classifiers, our attack faces two main differences. First, our attack is on the user-level but not on the data sample-level. Second, the adversary can only observe the ordered recommended items from a recommender system instead of prediction results in the form of posterior probabilities. To address the above challenges, we propose a novel method by representing users from relevant items. Moreover, a shadow recommender is established to derive the labeled training data for training the attack model. Extensive experimental results show that our attack framework achieves a strong performance. In addition, we design a defense mechanism to effectively mitigate the membership inference threat of recommender systems.
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