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Register a new userComparing Kalman Filters and Observers for Power System Dynamic State Estimation with Model Uncertainty and Malicious Cyber Attacks
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Junjian Qi
Publication date
2016
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Kalman filters and observers are two main classes of dynamic state estimation (DSE) routines. Power system DSE has been implemented by various Kalman filters, such as the extended Kalman filter (EKF) and the unscented Kalman filter (UKF). In this paper, we discuss two challenges for an effective power system DSE: (a) model uncertainty and (b) potential cyber attacks. To address this, the cubature Kalman filter (CKF) and a nonlinear observer are introduced and implemented. Various Kalman filters and the observer are then tested on the 16-machine, 68-bus system given realistic scenarios under model uncertainty and different types of cyber attacks against synchrophasor measurements. It is shown that CKF and the observer are more robust to model uncertainty and cyber attacks than their counterparts. Based on the tests, a thorough qualitative comparison is also performed for Kalman filter routines and observers.
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This paper proposes a fully distributed robust state-estimation (D-RBSE) method that is applicable to multi-area power systems with nonlinear measurements. We extend the recently introduced bilinear formulation of state estimation problems to a robust model. A distributed bilinear state-estimation procedure is developed. In both linear stages, the state estimation problem in each area is solved locally, with minimal data exchange with its neighbors. The intermediate nonlinear transformation can be performed by all areas in parallel without any need of inter-regional communication. This algorithm does not require a central coordinator and can compress bad measurements by introducing a robust state estimation model. Numerical tests on IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus benchmark systems demonstrate the validity of the method.
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We consider a class of malicious attacks against remote state estimation. A sensor with limited resources adopts an acknowledgement (ACK)-based online power schedule to improve the remote state estimation performance. A malicious attacker can modify the ACKs from the remote estimator and convey fake information to the sensor. When the capability of the attacker is limited, we propose an attack strategy for the attacker and analyze the corresponding effect on the estimation performance. The possible responses of the sensor are studied and a condition for the sensor to discard ACKs and switch from online schedule to offline schedule is provided.
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