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Register a new userPolytope Codes Against Adversaries in Networks
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Added by
Oliver Kosut
Publication date
2011
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Network coding is studied when an adversary controls a subset of nodes in the network of limited quantity but unknown location. This problem is shown to be more difficult than when the adversary controls a given number of edges in the network, in that linear codes are insufficient. To solve the node problem, the class of Polytope Codes is introduced. Polytope Codes are constant composition codes operating over bounded polytopes in integer vector fields. The polytope structure creates additional complexity, but it induces properties on marginal distributions of code vectors so that validities of codewords can be checked by internal nodes of the network. It is shown that Polytope Codes achieve a cut-set bound for a class of planar networks. It is also shown that this cut-set bound is not always tight, and a tighter bound is given for an example network.
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In this work we consider the communication of information in the presence of an online adversarial jammer. In the setting under study, a sender wishes to communicate a message to a receiver by transmitting a codeword x=x_1,...,x_n symbol-by-symbol over a communication channel. The adversarial jammer can view the transmitted symbols x_i one at a time, and can change up to a p-fraction of them. However, the decisions of the jammer must be made in an online or causal manner. More generally, for a delay parameter 0<d<1, we study the scenario in which the jammers decision on the corruption of x_i must depend solely on x_j for j < i - dn. In this work, we initiate the study of codes for online adversaries, and present a tight characterization of the amount of information one can transmit in both the 0-delay and, more generally, the d-delay online setting. We prove tight results for both additive and overwrite jammers when the transmitted symbols are assumed to be over a sufficiently large field F. Finally, we extend our results to a jam-or-listen online model, where the online adversary can either jam a symbol or eavesdrop on it. We again provide a tight characterization of the achievable rate for several variants of this model. The rate-regions we prove for each model are informational-theoretic in nature and hold for computationally unbounded adversaries. The rate regions are characterized by simple piecewise linear functions of p and d. The codes we construct to attain the optimal rate for each scenario are computationally efficient.
We study privacy-utility trade-offs where users share privacy-correlated useful information with a service provider to obtain some utility. The service provider is adversarial in the sense that it can infer the users private information based on the shared useful information. To minimize the privacy leakage while maintaining a desired level of utility, the users carefully perturb the useful information via a probabilistic privacy mapping before sharing it. We focus on the setting in which the adversary attempting an inference attack on the users privacy has potentially biased information about the statistical correlation between the private and useful variables. This information asymmetry between the users and the limited adversary leads to better privacy guarantees than the case of the omniscient adversary under the same utility requirement. We first identify assumptions on the adversarys information so that the inference costs are well-defined and finite. Then, we characterize the impact of the information asymmetry and show that it increases the inference costs for the adversary. We further formulate the design of the privacy mapping against a limited adversary using a difference of convex functions program and solve it via the concave-convex procedure. When the adversarys information is not precisely available, we adopt a Bayesian view and represent the adversarys information by a probability distribution. In this case, the expected cost for the adversary does not admit a closed-form expression, and we establish and maximize a lower bound of the expected cost. We provide a numerical example regarding a census data set to illustrate the theoretical results.
We study the trade-offs between storage/bandwidth and prediction accuracy of neural networks that are stored in noisy media. Conventionally, it is assumed that all parameters (e.g., weight and biases) of a trained neural network are stored as binary arrays and are error-free. This assumption is based upon the implementation of error correction codes (ECCs) that correct potential bit flips in storage media. However, ECCs add storage overhead and cause bandwidth reduction when loading the trained parameters during the inference. We study the robustness of deep neural networks when bit errors exist but ECCs are turned off for different neural network models and datasets. It is observed that more sophisticated models and datasets are more vulnerable to errors in their trained parameters. We propose a simple detection approach that can universally improve the robustness, which in some cases can be improved by orders of magnitude. We also propose an alternative binary representation of the parameters such that the distortion brought by bit flips is reduced and even theoretically vanishing when the number of bits to represent a parameter increases.
We consider the problem of communication over a channel with a causal jamming adversary subject to quadratic constraints. A sender Alice wishes to communicate a message to a receiver Bob by transmitting a real-valued length-$n$ codeword $mathbf{x}=x_1,...,x_n$ through a communication channel. Alice and Bob do not share common randomness. Knowing Alices encoding strategy, an adversarial jammer James chooses a real-valued length-n noise sequence $mathbf{s}=s_1,..,s_n$ in a causal manner, i.e., each $s_t (1<=t<=n)$ can only depend on $x_1,...,x_t$. Bob receives $mathbf{y}$, the sum of Alices transmission $mathbf{x}$ and James jamming vector $mathbf{s}$, and is required to reliably estimate Alices message from this sum. In addition, Alice and Jamess transmission powers are restricted by quadratic constraints $P>0$ and $N>0$. In this work, we characterize the channel capacity for such a channel as the limit superior of the optimal values of a series of optimizations. Upper and lower bounds on the optimal values are provided both analytically and numerically. Interestingly, unlike many communication problems, in this causal setting Alices optimal codebook may not have a uniform power allocation - for certain SNR, a codebook with a two-level uniform power allocation results in a strictly higher rate than a codebook with a uniform power allocation would.
In this paper we investigate the structure of the fundamental polytope used in the Linear Programming decoding introduced by Feldman, Karger and Wainwright. We begin by showing that for expander codes, every fractional pseudocodeword always has at least a constant fraction of non-integral bits. We then prove that for expander codes, the active set of any fractional pseudocodeword is smaller by a constant fraction than the active set of any codeword. We further exploit these geometrical properties to devise an improved decoding algorithm with the same complexity order as LP decoding that provably performs better, for any blocklength. It proceeds by guessing facets of the polytope, and then resolving the linear program on these facets. While the LP decoder succeeds only if the ML codeword has the highest likelihood over all pseudocodewords, we prove that the proposed algorithm, when applied to suitable expander codes, succeeds unless there exist a certain number of pseudocodewords, all adjacent to the ML codeword on the LP decoding polytope, and with higher likelihood than the ML codeword. We then describe an extended algorithm, still with polynomial complexity, that succeeds as long as there are at most polynomially many pseudocodewords above the ML codeword.
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