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Register a new userFCA: Learning a 3D Full-coverage Vehicle Camouflage for Multi-view Physical Adversarial Attack
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Added by
Donghua Wang
Publication date
2021
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Physical adversarial attacks in object detection have attracted increasing attention. However, most previous works focus on hiding the objects from the detector by generating an individual adversarial patch, which only covers the planar part of the vehicles surface and fails to attack the detector in physical scenarios for multi-view, long-distance and partially occluded objects. To bridge the gap between digital attacks and physical attacks, we exploit the full 3D vehicle surface to propose a robust Full-coverage Camouflage Attack (FCA) to fool detectors. Specifically, we first try rendering the non-planar camouflage texture over the full vehicle surface. To mimic the real-world environment conditions, we then introduce a transformation function to transfer the rendered camouflaged vehicle into a photo-realistic scenario. Finally, we design an efficient loss function to optimize the camouflage texture. Experiments show that the full-coverage camouflage attack can not only outperform state-of-the-art methods under various test cases but also generalize to different environments, vehicles, and object detectors.
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Deep learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples. As a more threatening type for practical deep learning systems, physical adversarial examples have received extensive research attention in recent years. However, without exploiting the intrinsic characteristics such as model-agnostic and human-specific patterns, existing works generate weak adversarial perturbations in the physical world, which fall short of attacking across different models and show visually suspicious appearance. Motivated by the viewpoint that attention reflects the intrinsic characteristics of the recognition process, this paper proposes the Dual Attention Suppression (DAS) attack to generate visually-natural physical adversarial camouflages with strong transferability by suppressing both model and human attention. As for attacking, we generate transferable adversarial camouflages by distracting the model-shared similar attention patterns from the target to non-target regions. Meanwhile, based on the fact that human visual attention always focuses on salient items (e.g., suspicious distortions), we evade the human-specific bottom-up attention to generate visually-natural camouflages which are correlated to the scenario context. We conduct extensive experiments in both the digital and physical world for classification and detection tasks on up-to-date models (e.g., Yolo-V5) and significantly demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art methods.
Learning cross-view consistent feature representation is the key for accurate vehicle Re-identification (ReID), since the visual appearance of vehicles changes significantly under different viewpoints. To this end, most existing approaches resort to the supervised cross-view learning using extensive extra viewpoints annotations, which however, is difficult to deploy in real applications due to the expensive labelling cost and the continous viewpoint variation that makes it hard to define discrete viewpoint labels. In this study, we present a pluggable Weakly-supervised Cross-View Learning (WCVL) module for vehicle ReID. Through hallucinating the cross-view samples as the hardest positive counterparts in feature domain, we can learn the consistent feature representation via minimizing the cross-view feature distance based on vehicle IDs only without using any viewpoint annotation. More importantly, the proposed method can be seamlessly plugged into most existing vehicle ReID baselines for cross-view learning without re-training the baselines. To demonstrate its efficacy, we plug the proposed method into a bunch of off-the-shelf baselines and obtain significant performance improvement on four public benchmark datasets, i.e., VeRi-776, VehicleID, VRIC and VRAI.
Whilst adversarial attack detection has received considerable attention, it remains a fundamentally challenging problem from two perspectives. First, while threat models can be well-defined, attacker strategies may still vary widely within those constraints. Therefore, detection should be considered as an open-set problem, standing in contrast to most current detection strategies. These methods take a closed-set view and train binary detectors, thus biasing detection toward attacks seen during detector training. Second, information is limited at test time and confounded by nuisance factors including the label and underlying content of the image. Many of the current high-performing techniques use training sets for dealing with some of these issues, but can be limited by the overall size and diversity of those sets during the detection step. We address these challenges via a novel strategy based on random subspace analysis. We present a technique that makes use of special properties of random projections, whereby we can characterize the behavior of clean and adversarial examples across a diverse set of subspaces. We then leverage the self-consistency (or inconsistency) of model activations to discern clean from adversarial examples. Performance evaluation demonstrates that our technique outperforms ($>0.92$ AUC) competing state of the art (SOTA) attack strategies, while remaining truly agnostic to the attack method itself. It also requires significantly less training data, composed only of clean examples, when compared to competing SOTA methods, which achieve only chance performance, when evaluated in a more rigorous testing scenario.
Modern deep neural networks are often vulnerable to adversarial samples. Based on the first optimization-based attacking method, many following methods are proposed to improve the attacking performance and speed. Recently, generation-based methods have received much attention since they directly use feed-forward networks to generate the adversarial samples, which avoid the time-consuming iterative attacking procedure in optimization-based and gradient-based methods. However, current generation-based methods are only able to attack one specific target (category) within one model, thus making them not applicable to real classification systems that often have hundreds/thousands of categories. In this paper, we propose the first Multi-target Adversarial Network (MAN), which can generate multi-target adversarial samples with a single model. By incorporating the specified category information into the intermediate features, it can attack any category of the target classification model during runtime. Experiments show that the proposed MAN can produce stronger attack results and also have better transferability than previous state-of-the-art methods in both multi-target attack task and single-target attack task. We further use the adversarial samples generated by our MAN to improve the robustness of the classification model. It can also achieve better classification accuracy than other methods when attacked by various methods.
This paper presents a novel patch-based adversarial attack pipeline that trains adversarial patches on 3D human meshes. We sample triangular faces on a reference human mesh, and create an adversarial texture atlas over those faces. The adversarial texture is transferred to human meshes in various poses, which are rendered onto a collection of real-world background images. Contrary to the traditional patch-based adversarial attacks, where prior work attempts to fool trained object detectors using appended adversarial patches, this new form of attack is mapped into the 3D object world and back-propagated to the texture atlas through differentiable rendering. As such, the adversarial patch is trained under deformation consistent with real-world materials. In addition, and unlike existing adversarial patches, our new 3D adversarial patch is shown to fool state-of-the-art deep object detectors robustly under varying views, potentially leading to an attacking scheme that is persistently strong in the physical world.
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