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We construct several explicit quantum secure non-malleable-extractors. All the quantum secure non-malleable-extractors we construct are based on the constructions by Chattopadhyay, Goyal and Li [2015] and Cohen [2015]. 1) We construct the first explicit quantum secure non-malleable-extractor for (source) min-entropy $k geq textsf{poly}left(log left( frac{n}{epsilon} right)right)$ ($n$ is the length of the source and $epsilon$ is the error parameter). Previously Aggarwal, Chung, Lin, and Vidick [2019] have shown that the inner-product based non-malleable-extractor proposed by Li [2012] is quantum secure, however it required linear (in $n$) min-entropy and seed length. Using the connection between non-malleable-extractors and privacy amplification (established first in the quantum setting by Cohen and Vidick [2017]), we get a $2$-round privacy amplification protocol that is secure against active quantum adversaries with communication $textsf{poly}left(log left( frac{n}{epsilon} right)right)$, exponentially improving upon the linear communication required by the protocol due to [2019]. 2) We construct an explicit quantum secure $2$-source non-malleable-extractor for min-entropy $k geq n- n^{Omega(1)}$, with an output of size $n^{Omega(1)}$ and error $2^{- n^{Omega(1)}}$. 3) We also study their natural extensions when the tampering of the inputs is performed $t$-times. We construct explicit quantum secure $t$-non-malleable-extractors for both seeded ($t=d^{Omega(1)}$) as well as $2$-source case ($t=n^{Omega(1)}$).
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Non-malleable secret sharing was recently proposed by Goyal and Kumar in independent tampering and joint tampering models for threshold secret sharing (STOC18) and secret sharing with general access structure (CRYPTO18). The idea of making secret sharing non-malleable received great attention and by now has generated many papers exploring new frontiers in this topic, such as multiple-time tampering and adding leakage resiliency to the one-shot tampering model. Non-compartmentalized tampering model was first studied by Agrawal et.al (CRYPTO15) for non-malleability against permutation composed with bit-wise independent tampering, and shown useful in constructing non-malleable string commitments. We initiate the study of leakage-resilient secret sharing in the non-compartmentalized model. The leakage adversary can corrupt several players and obtain their shares, as in normal secret sharing. The leakage adversary can apply arbitrary affine functions with bounded total output length to the full share vector and obtain the outputs as leakage. These two processes can be both non-adaptive and do not depend on each other, or both adaptive and depend on each other with arbitrary ordering. We construct such leakage-resilient secret sharing schemes and achieve constant information ratio (the scheme for non-adaptive adversary is near optimal). We then explore making the non-compartmentalized leakage-resilient secret sharing also non-malleable against tampering. We consider a tampering model, where the adversary can use the shares obtained from the corrupted players and the outputs of the global leakage functions to choose a tampering function from a tampering family F. We give two constructions of such leakage-resilient non-malleable secret sharing for the case F is the bit-wise independent tampering and, respectively, for the case F is the affine tampering functions.
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In this paper, we generalize a secured direct communication process between N users with partial and full cooperation of quantum server. The security analysis of authentication and communication processes against many types of attacks proved that the attacker cannot gain any information during intercepting either authentication or communication processes. Hence, the security of transmitted message among N users is ensured as the attacker introduces an error probability irrespective of the sequence of measurement.
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