Subscribe to the gold package and get unlimited access to Shamra Academy
Register a new userA Large-scale Temporal Measurement of Android Malicious Apps: Persistence, Migration, and Lessons Learned
68
0
0.0
(
0
)
Added by
Gianluca Stringhini
Publication date
2021
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
Ask ChatGPT about the research
No Arabic abstract
We study the temporal dynamics of potentially harmful apps (PHAs) on Android by leveraging 8.8M daily on-device detections collected among 11.7M customers of a popular mobile security product between 2019 and 2020. We show that the current security model of Android, which limits security products to run as regular apps and prevents them from automatically removing malicious apps opens a significant window of opportunity for attackers. Such apps warn users about the newly discovered threats, but users do not promptly act on this information, allowing PHAs to persist on their device for an average of 24 days after they are detected. We also find that while app markets remove PHAs after these become known, there is a significant delay between when PHAs are identified and when they are removed: PHAs persist on Google Play for 77 days on average and 34 days on third party marketplaces. Finally, we find evidence of PHAs migrating to other marketplaces after being removed on the original one. This paper provides an unprecedented view of the Android PHA landscape, showing that current defenses against PHAs on Android are not as effective as commonly thought, and identifying multiple research directions that the security community should pursue, from orchestrating more effective PHA takedowns to devising better alerts for mobile security products.
rate research
Read More
Mobile apps have become ubiquitous. For app developers, it is a key priority to ensure their apps correctness and reliability. However, many apps still suffer from occasional to frequent crashes, weakening their competitive edge. Large-scale, deep analyses of the characteristics of real-world app crashes can provide useful insights to guide developers, or help improve testing and analysis tools. However, such studies do not exist -- this paper fills this gap. Over a four-month long effort, we have collected 16,245 unique exception traces from 2,486 open-source Android apps, and observed that framework-specific exceptions account for the majority of these crashes. We then extensively investigated the 8,243 framework-specific exceptions (which took six person-months): (1) identifying their characteristics (e.g., manifestation locations, common fault categories), (2) evaluating their manifestation via state-of-the-art bug detection techniques, and (3) reviewing their fixes. Besides the insights they provide, these findings motivate and enable follow-up research on mobile apps, such as bug detection, fault localization and patch generation. In addition, to demonstrate the utility of our findings, we have optimized Stoat, a dynamic testing tool, and implemented ExLocator, an exception localization tool, for Android apps. Stoat is able to quickly uncover three previously-unknown, confirmed/fixed crashes in Gmail and Google+; ExLocator is capable of precisely locating the root causes of identified exceptions in real-world apps. Our substantial dataset is made publicly available to share with and benefit the community.
While there have been various studies towards Android apps and their development, there is limited discussion of the broader class of apps that fall in the fake area. Fake apps and their development are distinct from official apps and belong to the mobile underground industry. Due to the lack of knowledge of the mobile underground industry, fake apps, their ecosystem and nature still remain in mystery. To fill the blank, we conduct the first systematic and comprehensive empirical study on a large-scale set of fake apps. Over 150,000 samples related to the top 50 popular apps are collected for extensive measurement. In this paper, we present discoveries from three different perspectives, namely fake sample characteristics, quantitative study on fake samples and fake authors developing trend. Moreover, valuable domain knowledge, like fake apps naming tendency and fake developers evasive strategies, is then presented and confirmed with case studies, demonstrating a clear vision of fake apps and their ecosystem.
Third-party security apps are an integral part of the Android app ecosystem. Many users install them as an extra layer of protection for their devices. There are hundreds of such security apps, both free and paid in Google Play Store and some of them are downloaded millions of times. By installing security apps, the smartphone users place a significant amount of trust towards the security companies who developed these apps, because a fully functional mobile security app requires access to many smartphone resources such as the storage, text messages and email, browser history, and information about other installed applications. Often these resources contain highly sensitive personal information. As such, it is essential to understand the mobile security apps ecosystem to assess whether is it indeed beneficial to install them. To this end, in this paper, we present the first empirical study of Android security apps. We analyse 100 Android security apps from multiple aspects such as metadata, static analysis, and dynamic analysis and presents insights to their operations and behaviours. Our results show that 20% of the security apps we studied potentially resell the data they collect from smartphones to third parties; in some cases, even without the user consent. Also, our experiments show that around 50% of the security apps fail to identify malware installed on a smartphone.
Android malware detection is a critical step towards building a security credible system. Especially, manual search for the potential malicious code has plagued program analysts for a long time. In this paper, we propose Droidetec, a deep learning based method for android malware detection and malicious code localization, to model an application program as a natural language sequence. Droidetec adopts a novel feature extraction method to derive behavior sequences from Android applications. Based on that, the bi-directional Long Short Term Memory network is utilized for malware detection. Each unit in the extracted behavior sequence is inventively represented as a vector, which allows Droidetec to automatically analyze the semantics of sequence segments and eventually find out the malicious code. Experiments with 9616 malicious and 11982 benign programs show that Droidetec reaches an accuracy of 97.22% and an F1-score of 98.21%. In all, Droidetec has a hit rate of 91% to properly find out malicious code segments.
Access to privacy-sensitive information on Android is a growing concern in the mobile community. Albeit Google Play recently introduced some privacy guidelines, it is still an open problem to soundly verify whether apps actually comply with such rules. To this aim, in this paper, we discuss a novel methodology based on a fruitful combination of static analysis, dynamic analysis, and machine learning techniques, which allows assessing such compliance. More in detail, our methodology checks whether each app i) contains a privacy policy that complies with the Google Play privacy guidelines, and ii) accesses privacy-sensitive information only upon the acceptance of the policy by the user. Furthermore, the methodology also allows checking the compliance of third-party libraries embedded in the apps w.r.t. the same privacy guidelines. We implemented our methodology in a tool, 3PDroid, and we carried out an assessment on a set of recent and most-downloaded Android apps in the Google Play Store. Experimental results suggest that more than 95% of apps access users privacy-sensitive information, but just a negligible subset of them (around 1%) fully complies with the Google Play privacy guidelines.
Log in to be able to interact and post comments
comments
Fetching comments
Sign in to be able to follow your search criteria
