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Register a new userDo Language Models Perform Generalizable Commonsense Inference?
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Peifeng Wang
Publication date
2021
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Inspired by evidence that pretrained language models (LMs) encode commonsense knowledge, recent work has applied LMs to automatically populate commonsense knowledge graphs (CKGs). However, there is a lack of understanding on their generalization to multiple CKGs, unseen relations, and novel entities. This paper analyzes the ability of LMs to perform generalizable commonsense inference, in terms of knowledge capacity, transferability, and induction. Our experiments with these three aspects show that: (1) LMs can adapt to different schemas defined by multiple CKGs but fail to reuse the knowledge to generalize to new relations. (2) Adapted LMs generalize well to unseen subjects, but less so on novel objects. Future work should investigate how to improve the transferability and induction of commonsense mining from LMs.
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Contextualized representations trained over large raw text data have given remarkable improvements for NLP tasks including question answering and reading comprehension. There have been works showing that syntactic, semantic and word sense knowledge are contained in such representations, which explains why they benefit such tasks. However, relatively little work has been done investigating commonsense knowledge contained in contextualized representations, which is crucial for human question answering and reading comprehension. We study the commonsense ability of GPT, BERT, XLNet, and RoBERTa by testing them on seven challenging benchmarks, finding that language modeling and its variants are effective objectives for promoting models commonsense ability while bi-directional context and larger training set are bonuses. We additionally find that current models do poorly on tasks require more necessary inference steps. Finally, we test the robustness of models by making dual test cases, which are correlated so that the correct prediction of one sample should lead to correct prediction of the other. Interestingly, the models show confusion on these test cases, which suggests that they learn commonsense at the surface rather than the deep level. We release a test set, named CATs publicly, for future research.
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Lexical inference in context (LIiC) is the task of recognizing textual entailment between two very similar sentences, i.e., sentences that only differ in one expression. It can therefore be seen as a variant of the natural language inference task that is focused on lexical semantics. We formulate and evaluate the first approaches based on pretrained language models (LMs) for this task: (i) a few-shot NLI classifier, (ii) a relation induction approach based on handcrafted patterns expressing the semantics of lexical inference, and (iii) a variant of (ii) with patterns that were automatically extracted from a corpus. All our approaches outperform the previous state of the art, showing the potential of pretrained LMs for LIiC. In an extensive analysis, we investigate factors of success and failure of our three approaches.
Commonsense reasoning benchmarks have been largely solved by fine-tuning language models. The downside is that fine-tuning may cause models to overfit to task-specific data and thereby forget their knowledge gained during pre-training. Recent works only propose lightweight model updates as models may already possess useful knowledge from past experience, but a challenge remains in understanding what parts and to what extent models should be refined for a given task. In this paper, we investigate what models learn from commonsense reasoning datasets. We measure the impact of three different adaptation methods on the generalization and accuracy of models. Our experiments with two models show that fine-tuning performs best, by learning both the content and the structure of the task, but suffers from overfitting and limited generalization to novel answers. We observe that alternative adaptation methods like prefix-tuning have comparable accuracy, but generalize better to unseen answers and are more robust to adversarial splits.
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