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Register a new userSneak Attack against Mobile Robotic Networks under Formation Control
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The security of mobile robotic networks (MRNs) has been an active research topic in recent years. This paper demonstrates that the observable interaction process of MRNs under formation control will present increasingly severe threats. Specifically, we find that an external attack robot, who has only partial observation over MRNs while not knowing the system dynamics or access, can learn the interaction rules from observations and utilize them to replace a target robot, destroying the cooperation performance of MRNs. We call this novel attack as sneak, which endows the attacker with the intelligence of learning knowledge and is hard to be tackled by traditional defense techniques. The key insight is to separately reveal the internal interaction structure within robots and the external interaction mechanism with the environment, from the coupled state evolution influenced by the model-unknown rules and unobservable part of the MRN. To address this issue, we first provide general interaction process modeling and prove the learnability of the interaction rules. Then, with the learned rules, we design an Evaluate-Cut-Restore (ECR) attack strategy considering the partial interaction structure and geometric pattern. We also establish the sufficient conditions for a successful sneak with maximum control impacts over the MRN. Extensive simulations illustrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed attack.
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We study how to design a secure observer-based distributed controller such that a group of vehicles can achieve accurate state estimates and formation control even if the measurements of a subset of vehicle sensors are compromised by a malicious attacker. We propose an architecture consisting of a resilient observer, an attack detector, and an observer-based distributed controller. The distributed detector is able to update three sets of vehicle sensors: the ones surely under attack, surely attack-free, and suspected to be under attack. The adaptive observer saturates the measurement innovation through a preset static or time-varying threshold, such that the potentially compromised measurements have limited influence on the estimation. Essential properties of the proposed architecture include: 1) The detector is fault-free, and the attacked and attack-free vehicle sensors can be identified in finite time; 2) The observer guarantees both real-time error bounds and asymptotic error bounds, with tighter bounds when more attacked or attack-free vehicle sensors are identified by the detector; 3) The distributed controller ensures closed-loop stability. The effectiveness of the proposed methods is evaluated through simulations by an application to vehicle platooning.
With the rapid development of AI and robotics, transporting a large swarm of networked robots has foreseeable applications in the near future. Existing research in swarm robotics has mainly followed a bottom-up philosophy with predefined local coordination and control rules. However, it is arduous to verify the global requirements and analyze their performance. This motivates us to pursue a top-down approach, and develop a provable control strategy for deploying a robotic swarm to achieve a desired global configuration. Specifically, we use mean-field partial differential equations (PDEs) to model the swarm and control its mean-field density (i.e., probability density) over a bounded spatial domain using mean-field feedback. The presented control law uses density estimates as feedback signals and generates corresponding velocity fields that, by acting locally on individual robots, guide their global distribution to a target profile. The design of the velocity field is therefore centralized, but the implementation of the controller can be fully distributed -- individual robots sense the velocity field and derive their own velocity control signals accordingly. The key contribution lies in applying the concept of input-to-state stability (ISS) to show that the perturbed closed-loop system (a nonlinear and time-varying PDE) is locally ISS with respect to density estimation errors. The effectiveness of the proposed control laws is verified using agent-based simulations.
A novel false data injection attack (FDIA) model against DC state estimation is proposed, which requires no network parameters and exploits only limited phasor measurement unit (PMU) data. The proposed FDIA model can target specific states and launch large deviation attacks using estimated line parameters. Sufficient conditions for the proposed method are also presented. Different attack vectors are studied in the IEEE 39-bus system, showing that the proposed FDIA method can successfully bypass the bad data detection (BDD) with high success rates of up to 95.3%.
This paper studies distributed optimal formation control with hard constraints on energy levels and termination time, in which the formation error is to be minimized jointly with the energy cost. The main contributions include a globally optimal distributed formation control law and a comprehensive analysis of the resulting closed-loop system under those hard constraints. It is revealed that the energy levels, the task termination time, the steady-state error tolerance, as well as the network topology impose inherent limitations in achieving the formation control mission. Most notably, the lower bounds on the achievable termination time and the required minimum energy levels are derived, which are given in terms of the initial formation error, the steady-state error tolerance, and the largest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix. These lower bounds can be employed to assert whether an energy and time constrained formation task is achievable and how to accomplish such a task. Furthermore, the monotonicity of those lower bounds in relation to the control parameters is revealed. A simulation example is finally given to illustrate the obtained results.
In this paper, we first consider a pinning node selection and control gain co-design problem for complex networks. A necessary and sufficient condition for the synchronization of the pinning controlled networks at a homogeneous state is provided. A quantitative model is built to describe the pinning costs and to formulate the pinning node selection and control gain design problem for different scenarios into the corresponding optimization problems. Algorithms to solve these problems efficiently are presented. Based on the developed results, we take the existence of a malicious attacker into consideration and a resource allocation model for the defender and the malicious attacker is described. We set up a leader-follower Stackelberg game framework to study the behaviour of both sides and the equilibrium of this security game is investigated. Numerical examples and simulations are presented to demonstrate the main results.
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