No Arabic abstract
Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) is a non-standard interpretation of quantum theory based on the idea of abolishing the notion of absolute states of systems, in favor of states of systems relative to other systems. Such a move is claimed to solve the conceptual problems of standard quantum mechanics. Moreover, RQM has been argued to account for all quantum correlations without invoking non-local effects and, in spite of embracing a fully relational stance, to successfully explain how different observers exchange information. In this work, we carry out a thorough assessment of RQM and its purported achievements. We find that it fails to address the conceptual problems of standard quantum mechanics, and that it leads to serious conceptual problems of its own. We also uncover as unwarranted the claims that RQM can correctly explain information exchange among observers, and that it accommodates all quantum correlations without invoking non-local influences. We conclude that RQM is unsuccessful in its attempt to provide a satisfactory understanding of the quantum world.
In a recent paper, Rovelli responds to our critical assessment of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). His main argument is that our assessment lacks merit, because we fail to understand, or cope with, the premises of his theory; instead, he argues, we judge his proposal, blinded by the preconceptions inherent to ``our camp. Here, we explicitly show that our assessment judges RQM on its own terms, together with the basic requirements of precision, clarity, logical soundness and empirical suitability. Under those circumstances, we prove false Rovellis claim that RQM provides a satisfactory, realistic, non-solipsistic description of the world. Moreover, his reply serves us to further exhibit the serious problems of the RQM proposal, as well as the failures of its author to understanding the basic conceptual difficulties of quantum theory.
We present a derivation of the third postulate of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) from the properties of conditional probabilities.The first two RQM postulates are based on the information that can be extracted from interaction of different systems, and the third postulate defines the properties of the probability function. Here we demonstrate that from a rigorous definition of the conditional probability for the possible outcomes of different measurements, the third postulate is unnecessary and the Borns rule naturally emerges from the first two postulates by applying the Gleasons theorem. We demonstrate in addition that the probability function is uniquely defined for classical and quantum phenomena. The presence or not of interference terms is demonstrated to be related to the precise formulation of the conditional probability where distributive property on its arguments cannot be taken for granted. In the particular case of Youngs slits experiment, the two possible argument formulations correspond to the possibility or not to determine the particle passage through a particular path.
The subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics (QBism) and Rovellis relational interpretation of quantum mechanics (RQM) are both notable for embracing the radical idea that measurement outcomes correspond to events whose occurrence (or not) is relative to an observer. Here we provide a detailed study of their similarities and especially their differences.
A modified version of relational quantum mechanics is developed based on the three following ideas. An observer can develop an internally consistent description of the universe but it will, of necessity, differ in particulars from the description developed by any other observer. The state vector is epistomological and relative to a given quantum system as in the original relational quantum mechanics. If two quantum systems are entangled, they will observe themselves to be in just one of the many states in the Schmidt biorthonormal decomposition and not in a linear combination of many.
We discuss an article by Steven Weinberg expressing his discontent with the usual ways to understand quantum mechanics. We examine the two solutions that he considers and criticizes and propose another one, which he does not discuss, the pilot wave theory or Bohmian mechanics, for which his criticisms do not apply.