No Arabic abstract
It remains an open question how to determine the winner of an election given incomplete or uncertain voter preferences. One solution is to assume some probability space for the voting profile and declare the candidates having the best chance of winning to be the (co-)winners. We refer to this as the Most Probable Winner (MPW). In this paper, we propose an alternative winner interpretation for positional scoring rules - the Most Expected Winner (MEW), based on the expected performance of the candidates. This winner interpretation enjoys some desirable properties that the MPW does not. We establish the theoretical hardness of MEW over incomplete voter preferences, then identify a collection of tractable cases for a variety of voting profiles. An important contribution of this work is to separate the voter preferences into the generation step and the observation step, which gives rise to a unified voting profile combining both incomplete and probabilistic voting profiles.
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational complexity of Possible-Winner under the assumption that the voter preferences are $partitioned$. That is, we assume that every voter provides a complete order over sets of incomparable candidates (e.g., candidates are ranked by their level of education). We consider elections with partitioned profiles over positional scoring rules, with an unbounded number of candidates, and unweighted voters. Our first result is a polynomial time algorithm for voting rules with $2$ distinct values, which include the well-known $k$-approval voting rule. We then go on to prove NP-hardness for a class of rules that contain all voting rules that produce scoring vectors with at least $4$ distinct values.
The problem of allocating scarce items to individuals is an important practical question in market design. An increasingly popular set of mechanisms for this task uses the concept of market equilibrium: individuals report their preferences, have a budget of real or fake currency, and a set of prices for items and allocations is computed that sets demand equal to supply. An important real world issue with such mechanisms is that individual valuations are often only imperfectly known. In this paper, we show how concepts from classical market equilibrium can be extended to reflect such uncertainty. We show that in linear, divisible Fisher markets a robust market equilibrium (RME) always exists; this also holds in settings where buyers may retain unspent money. We provide theoretical analysis of the allocative properties of RME in terms of envy and regret. Though RME are hard to compute for general uncertainty sets, we consider some natural and tractable uncertainty sets which lead to well behaved formulations of the problem that can be solved via modern convex programming methods. Finally, we show that very mild uncertainty about valuations can cause RME allocations to outperform those which take estimates as having no underlying uncertainty.
We consider two-alternative elections where voters preferences depend on a state variable that is not directly observable. Each voter receives a private signal that is correlated to the state variable. Voters may be contingent with different preferences in different states; or predetermined with the same preference in every state. In this setting, even if every voter is a contingent voter, agents voting according to their private information need not result in the adoption of the universally preferred alternative, because the signals can be systematically biased. We present an easy-to-deploy mechanism that elicits and aggregates the private signals from the voters, and outputs the alternative that is favored by the majority. In particular, voters truthfully reporting their signals forms a strong Bayes Nash equilibrium (where no coalition of voters can deviate and receive a better outcome).
In recent work, Gourv`es, Lesca, and Wilczynski propose a variant of the classic housing markets model where the matching between agents and objects evolves through Pareto-improving swaps between pairs of adjacent agents in a social network. To explore the swap dynamics of their model, they pose several basic questions concerning the set of reachable matchings. In their work and other follow-up works, these questions have been studied for various classes of graphs: stars, paths, generalized stars (i.e., trees where at most one vertex has degree greater than two), trees, and cliques. For generalized stars and trees, it remains open whether a Pareto-efficient reachable matching can be found in polynomial time. In this paper, we pursue the same set of questions under a natural variant of their model. In our model, the social network is replaced by a network of objects, and a swap is allowed to take place between two agents if it is Pareto-improving and the associated objects are adjacent in the network. In those cases where the question of polynomial-time solvability versus NP-hardness has been resolved for the social network model, we are able to show that the same result holds for the network-of-objects model. In addition, for our model, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a Pareto-efficient reachable matching in generalized star networks. Moreover, the object reachability algorithm that we present for path networks is significantly faster than the known polynomial-time algorithms for the same question in the social network model.
We investigate the practical aspects of computing the necessary and possible winners in elections over incomplete voter preferences. In the case of the necessary winners, we show how to implement and accelerate the polynomial-time algorithm of Xia and Conitzer. In the case of the possible winners, where the problem is NP-hard, we give a natural reduction to Integer Linear Programming (ILP) for all positional scoring rules and implement it in a leading commercial optimization solver. Further, we devise optimization techniques to minimize the number of ILP executions and, oftentimes, avoid them altogether. We conduct a thorough experimental study that includes the construction of a rich benchmark of election data based on real and synthetic data. Our findings suggest that, the worst-case intractability of the possible winners notwithstanding, the algorithmic techniques presented here scale well and can be used to compute the possible winners in realistic scenarios.