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Register a new userGovernance for Security, Risks, Competition and Cooperation: Mapping the knowledge
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Added by
Julian D. Cortes
Publication date
2021
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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The study aims to generate a map of the knowledge based on the research on topics related to governance and security, risks, competition and cooperation for the FDDI (Fudan Development Institute) proceedings publishing project: Reflections on Governance: Security and Risks, Competition and Cooperation. That mapping exercise would enable a broader audience to delve into the current state, and interdisciplinary pathways of the research published worldwide for addressing complex problems of governance. Following this introduction, the second section presents the bibliometric methods used and the results interpretation. The third section presents the results, followed by the fourth and fifth sections of discussion and conclusion, respectively.
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The application of mathematics and statistical methods to scholarly communication: scientometrics, has facilitated the systematic analysis of the modern digital tide of literature. This chapter reviews three of such applications: coauthorship, bibliographic coupling, and coword networks. It also presents an exploratory case of study for the knowledge circulation literature. It was found a diverse geographical production, mainly in the Global North and Asian institutions with significant intermediation of universities from USA, Colombia, and Japan. The research fronts identified were related to science and medicines history and philosophy; education, health, policy studies; and a set of interdisciplinary topics. Finally, the knowledge pillars were comprised of urban planning policy, economic geography, and historical and theoretical perspectives in the Netherlands and Central Europe; globalization and science, technology, and innovation and historical and institutional frameworks in the UK; and cultural and learning studies in the XXI century.
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