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Register a new userCoalition-structured governance improves cooperation to provide public goods
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While the benefits of common and public goods are shared, they tend to be scarce when contributions are provided voluntarily. Failure to cooperate in the provision or preservation of these goods is fundamental to sustainability challenges, ranging from local fisheries to global climate change. In the real world, such cooperative dilemmas occur in multiple interactions with complex strategic interests and frequently without full information. We argue that voluntary cooperation enabled across multiple coalitions (akin to polycentricity) not only facilitates greater generation of non-excludable public goods, but may also allow evolution toward a more cooperative, stable, and inclusive approach to governance. Contrary to any previous study, we show that these merits of multi-coalition governance are far more general than the singular examples occurring in the literature, and are robust under diverse conditions of excludability, congestability of the non-excludable public good, and arbitrary shapes of the return-to-contribution function. We first confirm the intuition that a single coalition without enforcement and with players pursuing their self-interest without knowledge of returns to contribution is prone to cooperative failure. Next, we demonstrate that the same pessimistic model but with a multi-coalition structure of governance experiences relatively higher cooperation by enabling recognition of marginal gains of cooperation in the game at stake. In the absence of enforcement, public-goods regimes that evolve through a proliferation of voluntary cooperative forums can maintain and increase cooperation more successfully than singular, inclusive regimes.
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Productive societies feature high levels of cooperation and strong connections between individuals. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are frequently used to study the development of social connections and cooperative behavior in model societies. In such games, contributions to the public good are made only by cooperators, while all players, including defectors, can reap public goods benefits. Classic results of game theory show that mutual defection, as opposed to cooperation, is the Nash Equilibrium of PGGs in well-mixed populations, where each player interacts with all others. In this paper, we explore the coevolutionary dynamics of a low information public goods game on a network without spatial constraints in which players adapt to their environment in order to increase individual payoffs. Players adapt by changing their strategies, either to cooperate or to defect, and by altering their social connections. We find that even if players do not know other players strategies and connectivity, cooperation can arise and persist despite large short-term fluctuations.
We investigate an optimal investment-consumption and optimal level of insurance on durable consumption goods with a positive loading in a continuous-time economy. We assume that the economic agent invests in the financial market and in durable as well as perishable consumption goods to derive utilities from consumption over time in a jump-diffusion market. Assuming that the financial assets and durable consumption goods can be traded without transaction costs, we provide a semi-explicit solution for the optimal insurance coverage for durable goods and financial asset. With transaction costs for trading the durable good proportional to the total value of the durable good, we formulate the agents optimization problem as a combined stochastic and impulse control problem, with an implicit intervention value function. We solve this problem numerically using stopping time iteration, and analyze the numerical results using illustrative examples.
In this Brief Report we study the evolutionary dynamics of the Public Goods Game in a population of mobile agents embedded in a 2-dimensional space. In this framework, the backbone of interactions between agents changes in time, allowing us to study the impact that mobility has on the emergence of cooperation in structured populations. We compare our results with a static case in which agents interact on top of a Random Geometric Graph. Our results point out that a low degree of mobility enhances the onset of cooperation in the system while a moderate velocity favors the fixation of the full-cooperative state.
In the framework of the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoners Dilemma game on complex networks, we investigate the possibility that the average level of cooperation shows hysteresis under quasi-static variations of a model parameter (the temptation to defect). Under the discrete replicator strategy updating rule, for both Erdos-Renyi and Barabasi-Albert graphs we observe cooperation hysteresis cycles provided one reaches tipping point values of the parameter; otherwise, perfect reversibility is obtained. The selective fixation of cooperation at certain nodes and its organization in cooperator clusters, that are surrounded by fluctuating strategists, allows the rationalization of the lagging behind behavior observed.
We analyse the economics and epidemiology of different scenarios for a phased restart of the UK economy. Our economic model is designed to address the unique features of the COVID-19 pandemic. Social distancing measures affect both supply and demand, and input-output constraints play a key role in restricting economic output. Standard models for production functions are not adequate to model the short-term effects of lockdown. A survey of industry analysts conducted by IHS Markit allows us to evaluate which inputs for each industry are absolutely necessary for production over a two month period. Our model also includes inventory dynamics and feedback between unemployment and consumption. We demonstrate that economic outcomes are very sensitive to the choice of production function, show how supply constraints cause strong network effects, and find some counter-intuitive effects, such as that reopening only a few industries can actually lower aggregate output. Occupation-specific data and contact surveys allow us to estimate how different industries affect the transmission rate of the disease. We investigate six different re-opening scenarios, presenting our best estimates for the increase in R0 and the increase in GDP. Our results suggest that there is a reasonable compromise that yields a relatively small increase in R0 and delivers a substantial boost in economic output. This corresponds to a situation in which all non-consumer facing industries reopen, schools are open only for workers who need childcare, and everyone who can work from home continues to work from home.
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