No Arabic abstract
Face recognition (FR) systems have been widely applied in safety-critical fields with the introduction of deep learning. However, the existence of adversarial examples brings potential security risks to FR systems. To identify their vulnerability and help improve their robustness, in this paper, we propose Meaningful Adversarial Stickers, a physically feasible and easily implemented attack method by using meaningful real stickers existing in our life, where the attackers manipulate the pasting parameters of stickers on the face, instead of designing perturbation patterns and then printing them like most existing works. We conduct attacks in the black-box setting with limited information which is more challenging and practical. To effectively solve the pasting position, rotation angle, and other parameters of the stickers, we design Region based Heuristic Differential Algorithm, which utilizes the inbreeding strategy based on regional aggregation of effective solutions and the adaptive adjustment strategy of evaluation criteria. Extensive experiments are conducted on two public datasets including LFW and CelebA with respective to three representative FR models like FaceNet, SphereFace, and CosFace, achieving attack success rates of 81.78%, 72.93%, and 79.26% respectively with only hundreds of queries. The results in the physical world confirm the effectiveness of our method in complex physical conditions. When continuously changing the face posture of testers, the method can still perform successful attacks up to 98.46%, 91.30% and 86.96% in the time series.
Deep face recognition (FR) has achieved significantly high accuracy on several challenging datasets and fosters successful real-world applications, even showing high robustness to the illumination variation that is usually regarded as a main threat to the FR system. However, in the real world, illumination variation caused by diverse lighting conditions cannot be fully covered by the limited face dataset. In this paper, we study the threat of lighting against FR from a new angle, i.e., adversarial attack, and identify a new task, i.e., adversarial relighting. Given a face image, adversarial relighting aims to produce a naturally relighted counterpart while fooling the state-of-the-art deep FR methods. To this end, we first propose the physical model-based adversarial relighting attack (ARA) denoted as albedo-quotient-based adversarial relighting attack (AQ-ARA). It generates natural adversarial light under the physical lighting model and guidance of FR systems and synthesizes adversarially relighted face images. Moreover, we propose the auto-predictive adversarial relighting attack (AP-ARA) by training an adversarial relighting network (ARNet) to automatically predict the adversarial light in a one-step manner according to different input faces, allowing efficiency-sensitive applications. More importantly, we propose to transfer the above digital attacks to physical ARA (Phy-ARA) through a precise relighting device, making the estimated adversarial lighting condition reproducible in the real world. We validate our methods on three state-of-the-art deep FR methods, i.e., FaceNet, ArcFace, and CosFace, on two public datasets. The extensive and insightful results demonstrate our work can generate realistic adversarial relighted face images fooling FR easily, revealing the threat of specific light directions and strengths.
Most machine learning models are validated and tested on fixed datasets. This can give an incomplete picture of the capabilities and weaknesses of the model. Such weaknesses can be revealed at test time in the real world. The risks involved in such failures can be loss of profits, loss of time or even loss of life in certain critical applications. In order to alleviate this issue, simulators can be controlled in a fine-grained manner using interpretable parameters to explore the semantic image manifold. In this work, we propose a framework for learning how to test machine learning algorithms using simulators in an adversarial manner in order to find weaknesses in the model before deploying it in critical scenarios. We apply this model in a face recognition scenario. We are the first to show that weaknesses of models trained on real data can be discovered using simulated samples. Using our proposed method, we can find adversarial synthetic faces that fool contemporary face recognition models. This demonstrates the fact that these models have weaknesses that are not measured by commonly used validation datasets. We hypothesize that this type of adversarial examples are not isolated, but usually lie in connected components in the latent space of the simulator. We present a method to find these adversarial regions as opposed to the typical adversarial points found in the adversarial example literature.
It is known that deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. The so-called physical adversarial examples deceive DNN-based decisionmakers by attaching adversarial patches to real objects. However, most of the existing works on physical adversarial attacks focus on static objects such as glass frames, stop signs and images attached to cardboard. In this work, we proposed adversarial T-shirts, a robust physical adversarial example for evading person detectors even if it could undergo non-rigid deformation due to a moving persons pose changes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that models the effect of deformation for designing physical adversarial examples with respect to-rigid objects such as T-shirts. We show that the proposed method achieves74% and 57% attack success rates in the digital and physical worlds respectively against YOLOv2. In contrast, the state-of-the-art physical attack method to fool a person detector only achieves 18% attack success rate. Furthermore, by leveraging min-max optimization, we extend our method to the ensemble attack setting against two object detectors YOLO-v2 and Faster R-CNN simultaneously.
Deep learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples. As a more threatening type for practical deep learning systems, physical adversarial examples have received extensive research attention in recent years. However, without exploiting the intrinsic characteristics such as model-agnostic and human-specific patterns, existing works generate weak adversarial perturbations in the physical world, which fall short of attacking across different models and show visually suspicious appearance. Motivated by the viewpoint that attention reflects the intrinsic characteristics of the recognition process, this paper proposes the Dual Attention Suppression (DAS) attack to generate visually-natural physical adversarial camouflages with strong transferability by suppressing both model and human attention. As for attacking, we generate transferable adversarial camouflages by distracting the model-shared similar attention patterns from the target to non-target regions. Meanwhile, based on the fact that human visual attention always focuses on salient items (e.g., suspicious distortions), we evade the human-specific bottom-up attention to generate visually-natural camouflages which are correlated to the scenario context. We conduct extensive experiments in both the digital and physical world for classification and detection tasks on up-to-date models (e.g., Yolo-V5) and significantly demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art methods.
Face recognition has obtained remarkable progress in recent years due to the great improvement of deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs). However, deep CNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which can cause fateful consequences in real-world face recognition applications with security-sensitive purposes. Adversarial attacks are widely studied as they can identify the vulnerability of the models before they are deployed. In this paper, we evaluate the robustness of state-of-the-art face recognition models in the decision-based black-box attack setting, where the attackers have no access to the model parameters and gradients, but can only acquire hard-label predictions by sending queries to the target model. This attack setting is more practical in real-world face recognition systems. To improve the efficiency of previous methods, we propose an evolutionary attack algorithm, which can model the local geometries of the search directions and reduce the dimension of the search space. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method that induces a minimum perturbation to an input face image with fewer queries. We also apply the proposed method to attack a real-world face recognition system successfully.