No Arabic abstract
Some deep neural networks are invariant to some input transformations, such as Pointnet is permutation invariant to the input point cloud. In this paper, we demonstrated this property could be powerful in defense of gradient-based attacks. Specifically, we apply random input transformation which is invariant to the networks we want to defend. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed scheme defeats various gradient-based attackers in the targeted attack setting, and breaking the attack accuracy into nearly zero. Our code is available at: {footnotesize{url{https://github.com/cuge1995/IT-Defense}}}.
Deep visual models are susceptible to adversarial perturbations to inputs. Although these signals are carefully crafted, they still appear noise-like patterns to humans. This observation has led to the argument that deep visual representation is misaligned with human perception. We counter-argue by providing evidence of human-meaningful patterns in adversarial perturbations. We first propose an attack that fools a network to confuse a whole category of objects (source class) with a target label. Our attack also limits the unintended fooling by samples from non-sources classes, thereby circumscribing human-defined semantic notions for network fooling. We show that the proposed attack not only leads to the emergence of regular geometric patterns in the perturbations, but also reveals insightful information about the decision boundaries of deep models. Exploring this phenomenon further, we alter the `adversarial objective of our attack to use it as a tool to `explain deep visual representation. We show that by careful channeling and projection of the perturbations computed by our method, we can visualize a models understanding of human-defined semantic notions. Finally, we exploit the explanability properties of our perturbations to perform image generation, inpainting and interactive image manipulation by attacking adversarialy robust `classifiers.In all, our major contribution is a novel pragmatic adversarial attack that is subsequently transformed into a tool to interpret the visual models. The article also makes secondary contributions in terms of establishing the utility of our attack beyond the adversarial objective with multiple interesting applications.
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have recently led to significant improvements in many fields. However, DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples which are samples with imperceptible perturbations while dramatically misleading the DNNs. Moreover, adversarial examples can be used to perform an attack on various kinds of DNN based systems, even if the adversary has no access to the underlying model. Many defense methods have been proposed, such as obfuscating gradients of the networks or detecting adversarial examples. However it is proved out that these defense methods are not effective or cannot resist secondary adversarial attacks. In this paper, we point out that steganalysis can be applied to adversarial examples detection, and propose a method to enhance steganalysis features by estimating the probability of modifications caused by adversarial attacks. Experimental results show that the proposed method can accurately detect adversarial examples. Moreover, secondary adversarial attacks cannot be directly performed to our method because our method is not based on a neural network but based on high-dimensional artificial features and FLD (Fisher Linear Discriminant) ensemble.
Deep learning is a branch of artificial intelligence where networks of simple interconnected units are used to extract patterns from data in order to solve complex problems. Deep learning algorithms have shown groundbreaking performance in a variety of sophisticated tasks, especially those related to images. They have often matched or exceeded human performance. Since the medical field of radiology mostly relies on extracting useful information from images, it is a very natural application area for deep learning, and research in this area has rapidly grown in recent years. In this article, we review the clinical reality of radiology and discuss the opportunities for application of deep learning algorithms. We also introduce basic concepts of deep learning including convolutional neural networks. Then, we present a survey of the research in deep learning applied to radiology. We organize the studies by the types of specific tasks that they attempt to solve and review the broad range of utilized deep learning algorithms. Finally, we briefly discuss opportunities and challenges for incorporating deep learning in the radiology practice of the future.
Recent works show that deep neural networks trained on image classification dataset bias towards textures. Those models are easily fooled by applying small high-frequency perturbations to clean images. In this paper, we learn robust image classification models by removing high-frequency components. Specifically, we develop a differentiable high-frequency suppression module based on discrete Fourier transform (DFT). Combining with adversarial training, we won the 5th place in the IJCAI-2019 Alibaba Adversarial AI Challenge. Our code is available online.
Deep Neural Network classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial attack, where an imperceptible perturbation could result in misclassification. However, the vulnerability of DNN-based image ranking systems remains under-explored. In this paper, we propose two attacks against deep ranking systems, i.e., Candidate Attack and Query Attack, that can raise or lower the rank of chosen candidates by adversarial perturbations. Specifically, the expected ranking order is first represented as a set of inequalities, and then a triplet-like objective function is designed to obtain the optimal perturbation. Conversely, an anti-collapse triplet defense is proposed to improve the ranking model robustness against all proposed attacks, where the model learns to prevent the positive and negative samples being pulled close to each other by adversarial attack. To comprehensively measure the empirical adversarial robustness of a ranking model with our defense, we propose an empirical robustness score, which involves a set of representative attacks against ranking models. Our adversarial ranking attacks and defenses are evaluated on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CUB200-2011, CARS196 and Stanford Online Products datasets. Experimental results demonstrate that a typical deep ranking system can be effectively compromised by our attacks. Nevertheless, our defense can significantly improve the ranking system robustness, and simultaneously mitigate a wide range of attacks.