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Register a new userQualitative Planning in Imperfect Information Games with Active Sensing and Reactive Sensor Attacks: Cost of Unawareness
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Added by
Abhishek Kulkarni
Publication date
2021
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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We consider the probabilistic planning problem where the agent (called Player 1, or P1) can jointly plan the control actions and sensor queries in a sensor network and an attacker (called player 2, or P2) can carry out attacks on the sensors. We model such an adversarial interaction using a formal model -- a reachability game with partially controllable observation functions. The main contribution of this paper is to assess the cost of P1s unawareness: Suppose P1 misinterprets the sensor failures as probabilistic node failures due to unreliable network communication, and P2 is aware of P1s misinterpretation in addition to her partial observability. Then, from which states can P2 carry out sensor attacks to ensure, with probability one, that P1 will not be able to complete her reachability task even though, due to misinterpretation, P1 believes that she can almost-surely achieve her task. We develop an algorithm to solve the almost-sure winning sensor-attack strategy given P1s observation-based strategy. Our attack analysis could be used for attack detection in wireless communication networks and the design of provably secured attack-aware sensor allocation in decision-theoretic models for cyber-physical systems.
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This volume contains the proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Games, Automata, Logic and Formal Verification (GandALF 2020). The symposium took place as a fully online event on September 21-22, 2020. The GandALF symposium was established by a group of Italian computer scientists interested in mathematical logic, automata theory, game theory, and their applications to the specification, design, and verification of complex systems. Its aim is to provide a forum where people from different areas, and possibly with different backgrounds, can fruitfully interact. GandALF has a truly international spirit, as witnessed by the composition of the program and steering committee and by the country distribution of the submitted papers.
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