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Register a new userA Regulatory System for Optimal Legal Transaction Throughput in Cryptocurrency Blockchains
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Added by
Aditya Ahuja
Publication date
2021
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Permissionless blockchain consensus protocols have been designed primarily for defining decentralized economies for the commercial trade of assets, both virtual and physical, using cryptocurrencies. In most instances, the assets being traded are regulated, which mandates that the legal right to their trade and their trade value are determined by the governmental regulator of the jurisdiction in which the trade occurs. Unfortunately, existing blockchains do not formally recognise proposal of legal cryptocurrency transactions, as part of the execution of their respective consensus protocols, resulting in rampant illegal activities in the associated crypto-economies. In this contribution, we motivate the need for regulated blockchain consensus protocols with a case study of the illegal, cryptocurrency based, Silk Road darknet market. We present a novel regulatory framework for blockchain protocols, for ensuring legal transaction confirmation as part of the blockchain distributed consensus. As per our regulatory framework, we derive conditions under which legal transaction throughput supersedes throughput of traditional transactions, which are, in the worst case, an indifferentiable mix of legal and illegal transactions. Finally, we show that with a small change to the standard blockchain consensus execution policy (appropriately introduced through regulation), the legal transaction throughput in the blockchain network can be maximized.
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Many blockchain-based cryptocurrencies provide users with online blockchain explorers for viewing online transaction data. However, traditional blockchain explorers mostly present transaction information in textual and tabular forms. Such forms make understanding cryptocurrency transaction mechanisms difficult for novice users (NUsers). They are also insufficiently informative for experienced users (EUsers) to recognize advanced transaction information. This study introduces a new online cryptocurrency transaction data viewing tool called SilkViser. Guided by detailed scenario and requirement analyses, we create a series of appreciating visualization designs, such as paper ledger-inspired block and blockchain visualizations and ancient copper coin-inspired transaction visualizations, to help users understand cryptocurrency transaction mechanisms and recognize advanced transaction information. We also provide a set of lightweight interactions to facilitate easy and free data exploration. Moreover, a controlled user study is conducted to quantitatively evaluate the usability and effectiveness of SilkViser. Results indicate that SilkViser can satisfy the requirements of NUsers and EUsers. Our visualization designs can compensate for the inexperience of NUsers in data viewing and attract potential users to participate in cryptocurrency transactions.
Game theory is often used as a tool to analyze decentralized systems and their properties, in particular, blockchains. In this note, we take the opposite view. We argue that blockchains can and should be used to implement economic mechanisms because they can help to overcome problems that occur if trust in the mechanism designer cannot be assumed. Mechanism design deals with the allocation of resources to agents, often by extracting private information from them. Some mechanisms are immune to early information disclosure, while others may heavily depend on it. Some mechanisms have to randomize to achieve fairness and efficiency. Both issues, information disclosure, and randomness require trust in the mechanism designer. If there is no trust, mechanisms can be manipulated. We claim that mechanisms that use randomness or sequential information disclosure are much harder, if not impossible, to audit. Therefore, centralized implementation is often not a good solution. We consider some of the most frequently used mechanisms in practice and identify circumstances under which manipulation is possible. We propose a decentralized implementation of such mechanisms, that can be, in practical terms, realized by blockchain technology. Moreover, we argue in which environments a decentralized implementation of a mechanism brings a significant advantage.
Low transaction throughput and poor scalability are significant issues in public blockchain consensus protocols such as Bitcoins. Recent research efforts in this direction have proposed shard-based consensus protocols where the key idea is to split the transactions among multiple committees (or shards), which then process these shards or set of transactions in parallel. Such a parallel processing of disjoint sets of transactions or shards by multiple committees significantly improves the overall scalability and transaction throughout of the system. However, one significant research gap is a lack of understanding of the strategic behavior of rational processors within committees in such shard-based consensus protocols. Such an understanding is critical for designing appropriate incentives that will foster cooperation within committees and prevent free-riding. In this paper, we address this research gap by analyzing the behavior of processors using a game-theoretic model, where each processor aims at maximizing its reward at a minimum cost of participating in the protocol. We first analyze the Nash equilibria in an N-player static game model of the sharding protocol. We show that depending on the reward sharing approach employed, processors can potentially increase their payoff by unilaterally behaving in a defective fashion, thus resulting in a social dilemma. In order to overcome this social dilemma, we propose a novel incentive-compatible reward sharing mechanism to promote cooperation among processors. Our numerical results show that achieving a majority of cooperating processors (required to ensure a healthy state of the blockchain network) is easier to achieve with the proposed incentive-compatible reward sharing mechanism than with other reward sharing mechanisms.
A blockchain is an append-only linked-list of blocks, which is maintained at each participating node. Each block records a set of transactions and their associated metadata. Blockchain transactions act on the identical ledger data stored at each node. Blockchain was first perceived by Satoshi Nakamoto as a peer-to-peer digital-commodity (also known as crypto-currency) exchange system. Blockchains received traction due to their inherent property of immutability-once a block is accepted, it cannot be reverted.
The last decade has experienced a vast interest in Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies with a specific focus on the applications of this technology. However, slow confirmation times of transactions and unforeseeable high fees hamper their wide adoption for micro-payments. The idea of establishing payment channel networks is one of the many proposed solutions to address this scalability issue where nodes, by utilizing smart contracting, establish payment channels between each other and perform off-chain transactions. However, due to the way these channels are created, both sides have a certain one-way capacity for making transactions. Consequently, if one sides exceeds this one-way capacity, the channel becomes useless in that particular direction, which causes failures of payments and eventually creates an imbalance in the overall network. To keep the payment channel network sustainable, in this paper, we aim to increase the overall success rate of payments by effectively exploiting the fact that end-users are usually connected to the network at multiple points (i.e., gateways) any of which can be used to initiate the payment. We propose an efficient method for selection of the gateway for a user by considering the gateways inbound and outbound payment traffic ratio. We then augment this proposed method with split payment capability to further increase success rate especially for large transactions. The evaluation of the proposed method shows that compared to greedy and maxflow-based approaches, we can achieve much higher success rates, which are further improved with split payments.
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