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Register a new userThe Limits of Global Inclusion in AI Development
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Added by
Angelina Wang
Publication date
2021
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Those best-positioned to profit from the proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) systems are those with the most economic power. Extant global inequality has motivated Western institutions to involve more diverse groups in the development and application of AI systems, including hiring foreign labour and establishing extra-national data centers and laboratories. However, given both the propensity of wealth to abet its own accumulation and the lack of contextual knowledge in top-down AI solutions, we argue that more focus should be placed on the redistribution of power, rather than just on including underrepresented groups. Unless more is done to ensure that opportunities to lead AI development are distributed justly, the future may hold only AI systems which are unsuited to their conditions of application, and exacerbate inequality.
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Activists, journalists, and scholars have long raised critical questions about the relationship between diversity, representation, and structural exclusions in data-intensive tools and services. We build on work mapping the emergent landscape of corporate AI ethics to center one outcome of these conversations: the incorporation of diversity and inclusion in corporate AI ethics activities. Using interpretive document analysis and analytic tools from the values in design field, we examine how diversity and inclusion work is articulated in public-facing AI ethics documentation produced by three companies that create application and services layer AI infrastructure: Google, Microsoft, and Salesforce. We find that as these documents make diversity and inclusion more tractable to engineers and technical clients, they reveal a drift away from civil rights justifications that resonates with the managerialization of diversity by corporations in the mid-1980s. The focus on technical artifacts, such as diverse and inclusive datasets, and the replacement of equity with fairness make ethical work more actionable for everyday practitioners. Yet, they appear divorced from broader DEI initiatives and other subject matter experts that could provide needed context to nuanced decisions around how to operationalize these values. Finally, diversity and inclusion, as configured by engineering logic, positions firms not as ethics owners but as ethics allocators; while these companies claim expertise on AI ethics, the responsibility of defining who diversity and inclusion are meant to protect and where it is relevant is pushed downstream to their customers.
With the recent wave of progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has come a growing awareness of the large-scale impacts of AI systems, and recognition that existing regulations and norms in industry and academia are insufficient to ensure responsible AI development. In order for AI developers to earn trust from system users, customers, civil society, governments, and other stakeholders that they are building AI responsibly, they will need to make verifiable claims to which they can be held accountable. Those outside of a given organization also need effective means of scrutinizing such claims. This report suggests various steps that different stakeholders can take to improve the verifiability of claims made about AI systems and their associated development processes, with a focus on providing evidence about the safety, security, fairness, and privacy protection of AI systems. We analyze ten mechanisms for this purpose--spanning institutions, software, and hardware--and make recommendations aimed at implementing, exploring, or improving those mechanisms.
Like any technology, AI systems come with inherent risks and potential benefits. It comes with potential disruption of established norms and methods of work, societal impacts and externalities. One may think of the adoption of technology as a form of social contract, which may evolve or fluctuate in time, scale, and impact. It is important to keep in mind that for AI, meeting the expectations of this social contract is critical, because recklessly driving the adoption and implementation of unsafe, irresponsible, or unethical AI systems may trigger serious backlash against industry and academia involved which could take decades to resolve, if not actually seriously harm society. For the purpose of this paper, we consider that a social contract arises when there is sufficient consensus within society to adopt and implement this new technology. As such, to enable a social contract to arise for the adoption and implementation of AI, developing: 1) A socially accepted purpose, through 2) A safe and responsible method, with 3) A socially aware level of risk involved, for 4) A socially beneficial outcome, is key.
AI researchers employ not only the scientific method, but also methodology from mathematics and engineering. However, the use of the scientific method - specifically hypothesis testing - in AI is typically conducted in service of engineering objectives. Growing interest in topics such as fairness and algorithmic bias show that engineering-focused questions only comprise a subset of the important questions about AI systems. This results in the AI Knowledge Gap: the number of unique AI systems grows faster than the number of studies that characterize these systems behavior. To close this gap, we argue that the study of AI could benefit from the greater inclusion of researchers who are well positioned to formulate and test hypotheses about the behavior of AI systems. We examine the barriers preventing social and behavioral scientists from conducting such studies. Our diagnosis suggests that accelerating the scientific study of AI systems requires new incentives for academia and industry, mediated by new tools and institutions. To address these needs, we propose a two-sided marketplace called TuringBox. On one side, AI contributors upload existing and novel algorithms to be studied scientifically by others. On the other side, AI examiners develop and post machine intelligence tasks designed to evaluate and characterize algorithmic behavior. We discuss this markets potential to democratize the scientific study of AI behavior, and thus narrow the AI Knowledge Gap.
In February 2020, the European Commission (EC) published a white paper entitled, On Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust. This paper outlines the ECs policy options for the promotion and adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) in the European Union. The Montreal AI Ethics Institute (MAIEI) reviewed this paper and published a response addressing the ECs plans to build an ecosystem of excellence and an ecosystem of trust, as well as the safety and liability implications of AI, the internet of things (IoT), and robotics. MAIEI provides 15 recommendations in relation to the sections outlined above, including: 1) focus efforts on the research and innovation community, member states, and the private sector; 2) create alignment between trading partners policies and EU policies; 3) analyze the gaps in the ecosystem between theoretical frameworks and approaches to building trustworthy AI; 4) focus on coordination and policy alignment; 5) focus on mechanisms that promote private and secure sharing of data; 6) create a network of AI research excellence centres to strengthen the research and innovation community; 7) promote knowledge transfer and develop AI expertise through Digital Innovation Hubs; 8) add nuance to the discussion regarding the opacity of AI systems; 9) create a process for individuals to appeal an AI systems decision or output; 10) implement new rules and strengthen existing regulations; 11) ban the use of facial recognition technology; 12) hold all AI systems to similar standards and compulsory requirements; 13) ensure biometric identification systems fulfill the purpose for which they are implemented; 14) implement a voluntary labelling system for systems that are not considered high-risk; 15) appoint individuals to the oversight process who understand AI systems well and are able to communicate potential risks.
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