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Register a new userTSO-DSO Operational Planning Coordination through $l_1$-Proximal Surrogate Lagrangian Relaxation
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The proliferation of distributed energy resources (DERs), located at the Distribution System Operator (DSO) level, bring new opportunities as well as new challenges to the operations within the grid, specifically, when it comes to the interaction with the Transmission System Operator (TSO). To enable interoperability, while ensuring higher flexibility and cost-efficiency, DSOs and the TSO need to be efficiently coordinated. Difficulties behind creating such TSO-DSO coordination include the combinatorial nature of the operational planning problem involved at the transmission level as well as the nonlinearity of AC power flow within both systems. These considerations significantly increase the complexity even under the deterministic setting. In this paper, a deterministic TSO-DSO operational planning coordination problem is considered and a novel decomposition and coordination approach is developed. Within the new method, the problem is decomposed into TSO and DSO subproblems, which are efficiently coordinated by updating Lagrangian multipliers. The nonlinearities at the TSO level caused by AC power flow constraints are resolved through a dynamic linearization while guaranteeing feasibility through $l_1$-proximal terms. Numerical results based on the coordination of the 118-bus TSO system with up to 32 DSO 34-bus systems indicate that the method efficiently overcomes the computational difficulties of the problem.
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The increase in distributed energy resources and flexible electricity consumers has turned TSO-DSO coordination strategies into a challenging problem. Existing decomposition/decentralized methods apply divide-and-conquer strategies to trim down the computational burden of this complex problem, but rely on access to proprietary information or fail-safe real-time communication infrastructures. To overcome these drawbacks, we propose in this paper a TSO-DSO coordination strategy that only needs a series of observations of the nodal price and the power intake at the substations connecting the transmission and distribution networks. Using this information, we learn the price response of active distribution networks (DN) using a decreasing step-wise function that can also adapt to some contextual information. The learning task can be carried out in a computationally efficient manner and the curve it produces can be interpreted as a market bid, thus averting the need to revise the current operational procedures for the transmission network. Inaccuracies derived from the learning task may lead to suboptimal decisions. However, results from a realistic case study show that the proposed methodology yields operating decisions very close to those obtained by a fully centralized coordination of transmission and distribution.
The integration of energy systems such as electricity and gas grids and power and thermal grids can bring significant benefits in terms of system security, reliability, and reduced emissions. Another alternative coupling of sectors with large potential benefits is the power and transportation networks. This is primarily due to the increasing use of electric vehicles (EV) and their demand on the power grid. Besides, the production and operating costs of EVs and battery technologies are steadily decreasing, while tax credits for EV purchase and usage are being offered to users in developed countries. The power grid is also undergoing major upgrades and changes with the aim of ensuring environmentally sustainable grids. These factors influence our work. We present a new operating model for an integrated EV-grid system that incorporates a set of aggregators (owning a fleet of EVs) with partial access to the distribution grid. Then, the Cooperative Game Theory is used to model the behavior of the system. The Core is used to describe the stability of the interaction between these aggregators, and the Shapley value is used to assign costs to them. The results obtained show the benefit of cooperation, which could lead to an overall reduction in energy consumption, reduced operating costs for electric vehicles and the distribution grid, and, in some cases, the additional monetary budget available to reinforce the transmission and grid infrastructures.
This paper studies coordination problem for time-varying networks suffering from antagonistic information, quantified by scaling parameters. By such a manner, interacting property of the participating individuals and antagonistic information can be quantified in a fully decoupled perspective, thus benefiting from merely directed spanning tree hypothesis is needed, in the sense of usual algebraic graph theory. We start with rigorous argument on the existence of weighted gain, and then derive relation among weighted gain, scaling parameter and Laplacian matrix guaranteeing antagonistic information cannot diverge system state. Based on these arguments, we devise coordination algorithm constrained by topology-dependent average time condition, thus relaxing the examination of directed spanning tree requirement for the union graph that is usually intractable. Moreover, the induced theoretical results are applied to time-varying networks with several mutually uninfluenced agents, in accompanying with some discussions and comparisons with respect to the existing developments.
This paper proposes decentralized resource-aware coordination schemes for solving network optimization problems defined by objective functions which combine locally evaluable costs with network-wide coupling components. These methods are well suited for a group of supervised agents trying to solve an optimization problem under mild coordination requirements. Each agent has information on its local cost and coordinates with the network supervisor for information about the coupling term of the cost. The proposed approach is feedback-based and asynchronous by design, guarantees anytime feasibility, and ensures the asymptotic convergence of the network state to the desired optimizer. Numerical simulations on a power system example illustrate our results.
We study the strategic interaction among vehicles in a non-cooperative platoon coordination game. Vehicles have predefined routes in a transportation network with a set of hubs where vehicles can wait for other vehicles to form platoons. Vehicles decide on their waiting times at hubs and the utility function of each vehicle includes both the benefit from platooning and the cost of waiting. We show that the platoon coordination game is a potential game when the travel times are either deterministic or stochastic, and the vehicles decide on their waiting times at the beginning of their journeys. We also propose two feedback solutions for the coordination problem when the travel times are stochastic and vehicles are allowed to update their strategies along their routes. The solutions are evaluated in a simulation study over the Swedish road network. It is shown that uncertainty in travel times affects the total benefit of platooning drastically and the benefit from platooning in the system increases significantly when utilizing feedback solutions.
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