No Arabic abstract
We consider games of chance played by someone with external capital that cannot be applied to the game and determine how this affects risk-adjusted optimal betting. Specifically, we focus on Kelly optimization as a metric, optimizing the expected logarithm of total capital including both capital in play and the external capital. For games with multiple rounds, we determine the optimal strategy through dynamic programming and construct a close approximation through the WKB method. The strategy can be described in terms of short-term utility functions, with risk aversion depending on the ratio of the amount in the game to the external money. Thus, a rational players behavior varies between conservative play that approaches Kelly strategy as they are able to invest a larger fraction of total wealth and extremely aggressive play that maximizes linear expectation when a larger portion of their capital is locked away. Because you always have expected future productivity to account for as external resources, this goes counter to the conventional wisdom that super-Kelly betting is a ruinous proposition.
We propose a data-driven portfolio selection model that integrates side information, conditional estimation and robustness using the framework of distributionally robust optimization. Conditioning on the observed side information, the portfolio manager solves an allocation problem that minimizes the worst-case conditional risk-return trade-off, subject to all possible perturbations of the covariate-return probability distribution in an optimal transport ambiguity set. Despite the non-linearity of the objective function in the probability measure, we show that the distributionally robust portfolio allocation with side information problem can be reformulated as a finite-dimensional optimization problem. If portfolio decisions are made based on either the mean-variance or the mean-Conditional Value-at-Risk criterion, the resulting reformulation can be further simplified to second-order or semi-definite cone programs. Empirical studies in the US and Chinese equity markets demonstrate the advantage of our integrative framework against other benchmarks.
In this article we solve the problem of maximizing the expected utility of future consumption and terminal wealth to determine the optimal pension or life-cycle fund strategy for a cohort of pension fund investors. The setup is strongly related to a DC pension plan where additionally (individual) consumption is taken into account. The consumption rate is subject to a time-varying minimum level and terminal wealth is subject to a terminal floor. Moreover, the preference between consumption and terminal wealth as well as the intertemporal coefficient of risk aversion are time-varying and therefore depend on the age of the considered pension cohort. The optimal consumption and investment policies are calculated in the case of a Black-Scholes financial market framework and hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility functions. We generalize Ye (2008) (2008 American Control Conference, 356-362) by adding an age-dependent coefficient of risk aversion and extend Steffensen (2011) (Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 35(5), 659-667), Hentschel (2016) (Doctoral dissertation, Ulm University) and Aase (2017) (Stochastics, 89(1), 115-141) by considering consumption in combination with terminal wealth and allowing for consumption and terminal wealth floors via an application of HARA utility functions. A case study on fitting several models to realistic, time-dependent life-cycle consumption and relative investment profiles shows that only our extended model with time-varying preference parameters provides sufficient flexibility for an adequate fit. This is of particular interest to life-cycle products for (private) pension investments or pension insurance in general.
A new approach in stochastic optimization via the use of stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics (SGLD) algorithms, which is a variant of stochastic gradient decent (SGD) methods, allows us to efficiently approximate global minimizers of possibly complicated, high-dimensional landscapes. With this in mind, we extend here the non-asymptotic analysis of SGLD to the case of discontinuous stochastic gradients. We are thus able to provide theoretical guarantees for the algorithms convergence in (standard) Wasserstein distances for both convex and non-convex objective functions. We also provide explicit upper estimates of the expected excess risk associated with the approximation of global minimizers of these objective functions. All these findings allow us to devise and present a fully data-driven approach for the optimal allocation of weights for the minimization of CVaR of portfolio of assets with complete theoretical guarantees for its performance. Numerical results illustrate our main findings.
This is an expanded version of the lecture given at the AMS Short Course on Mean Field Games, on January 13, 2020 in Denver CO. The assignment was to discuss applications of Mean Field Games in finance and economics. I need to admit upfront that several of the examples reviewed in this chapter were already discussed in book form. Still, they are here accompanied with discussions of, and references to, works which appeared over the last three years. Moreover, several completely new sections are added to show how recent developments in financial engineering and economics can benefit from being viewed through the lens of the Mean Field Game paradigm. The new financial engineering applications deal with bitcoin mining and the energy markets, while the new economic applications concern models offering a smooth transition between macro-economics and finance, and contract theory.
In this paper we propose a theoretical model including a susceptible-infected-recovered-dead (SIRD) model of epidemic in a dynamic macroeconomic general equilibrium framework with agents mobility. The latter affect both their income (and consumption) and their probability of infecting and of being infected. Strategic complementarities among individual mobility choices drive the evolution of aggregate economic activity, while infection externalities caused by individual mobility affect disease diffusion. Rational expectations of forward looking agents on the dynamics of aggregate mobility and epidemic determine individual mobility decisions. The model allows to evaluate alternative scenarios of mobility restrictions, especially policies dependent on the state of epidemic. We prove the existence of an equilibrium and provide a recursive construction method for finding equilibrium(a), which also guides our numerical investigations. We calibrate the model by using Italian experience on COVID-19 epidemic in the period February 2020 - May 2021. We discuss how our economic SIRD (ESIRD) model produces a substantially different dynamics of economy and epidemic with respect to a SIRD model with constant agents mobility. Finally, by numerical explorations we illustrate how the model can be used to design an efficient policy of state-of-epidemic-dependent mobility restrictions, which mitigates the epidemic peaks stressing health system, and allows for trading-off the economic losses due to reduced mobility with the lower death rate due to the lower spread of epidemic.