No Arabic abstract
We present a method for computing exact reachable sets for deep neural networks with rectified linear unit (ReLU) activation. Our method is well-suited for use in rigorous safety analysis of robotic perception and control systems with deep neural network components. Our algorithm can compute both forward and backward reachable sets for a ReLU network iterated over multiple time steps, as would be found in a perception-action loop in a robotic system. Our algorithm is unique in that it builds the reachable sets by incrementally enumerating polyhedral cells in the input space, rather than iterating layer-by-layer through the network as in other methods. If an unsafe cell is found, our algorithm can return this result without completing the full reachability computation, thus giving an anytime property that accelerates safety verification. In addition, our method requires less memory during execution compared to existing methods where memory can be a limiting factor. We demonstrate our algorithm on safety verification of the ACAS Xu aircraft advisory system. We find unsafe actions many times faster than the fastest existing method and certify no unsafe actions exist in about twice the time of the existing method. We also compute forward and backward reachable sets for a learned model of pendulum dynamics over a 50 time step horizon in 87s on a laptop computer. Algorithm source code: https://github.com/StanfordMSL/Neural-Network-Reach.
In this work, the reachable set estimation and safety verification problems for a class of piecewise linear systems equipped with neural network controllers are addressed. The neural network is considered to consist of Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation functions. A layer-by-layer approach is developed for the output reachable set computation of ReLU neural networks. The computation is formulated in the form of a set of manipulations for a union of polytopes. Based on the output reachable set for neural network controllers, the output reachable set for a piecewise linear feedback control system can be estimated iteratively for a given finite-time interval. With the estimated output reachable set, the safety verification for piecewise linear systems with neural network controllers can be performed by checking the existence of intersections of unsafe regions and output reach set. A numerical example is presented to illustrate the effectiveness of our approach.
Neural networks have been widely used to solve complex real-world problems. Due to the complicate, nonlinear, non-convex nature of neural networks, formal safety guarantees for the output behaviors of neural networks will be crucial for their applications in safety-critical systems.In this paper, the output reachable set computation and safety verification problems for a class of neural networks consisting of Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation functions are addressed. A layer-by-layer approach is developed to compute output reachable set. The computation is formulated in the form of a set of manipulations for a union of polyhedra, which can be efficiently applied with the aid of polyhedron computation tools. Based on the output reachable set computation results, the safety verification for a ReLU neural network can be performed by checking the intersections of unsafe regions and output reachable set described by a union of polyhedra. A numerical example of a randomly generated ReLU neural network is provided to show the effectiveness of the approach developed in this paper.
Deep learning methods can be used to produce control policies, but certifying their safety is challenging. The resulting networks are nonlinear and often very large. In response to this challenge, we present OVERT: a sound algorithm for safety verification of nonlinear discrete-time closed loop dynamical systems with neural network control policies. The novelty of OVERT lies in combining ideas from the classical formal methods literature with ideas from the newer neural network verification literature. The central concept of OVERT is to abstract nonlinear functions with a set of optimally tight piecewise linear bounds. Such piecewise linear bounds are designed for seamless integration into ReLU neural network verification tools. OVERT can be used to prove bounded-time safety properties by either computing reachable sets or solving feasibility queries directly. We demonstrate various examples of safety verification for several classical benchmark examples. OVERT compares favorably to existing methods both in computation time and in tightness of the reachable set.
Autonomous cyber-physical systems (CPS) rely on the correct operation of numerous components, with state-of-the-art methods relying on machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) components in various stages of sensing and control. This paper develops methods for estimating the reachable set and verifying safety properties of dynamical systems under control of neural network-based controllers that may be implemented in embedded software. The neural network controllers we consider are feedforward neural networks called multilayer perceptrons (MLP) with general activation functions. As such feedforward networks are memoryless, they may be abstractly represented as mathematical functions, and the reachability analysis of the network amounts to range (image) estimation of this function provided a set of inputs. By discretizing the input set of the MLP into a finite number of hyper-rectangular cells, our approach develops a linear programming (LP) based algorithm for over-approximating the output set of the MLP with its input set as a union of hyper-rectangular cells. Combining the over-approximation for the output set of an MLP based controller and reachable set computation routines for ordinary difference/differential equation (ODE) models, an algorithm is developed to estimate the reachable set of the closed-loop system. Finally, safety verification for neural network control systems can be performed by checking the existence of intersections between the estimated reachable set and unsafe regions. The approach is implemented in a computational software prototype and evaluated on numerical examples.
Increasingly sophisticated mathematical modelling processes from Machine Learning are being used to analyse complex data. However, the performance and explainability of these models within practical critical systems requires a rigorous and continuous verification of their safe utilisation. Working towards addressing this challenge, this paper presents a principled novel safety argument framework for critical systems that utilise deep neural networks. The approach allows various forms of predictions, e.g., future reliability of passing some demands, or confidence on a required reliability level. It is supported by a Bayesian analysis using operational data and the recent verification and validation techniques for deep learning. The prediction is conservative -- it starts with partial prior knowledge obtained from lifecycle activities and then determines the worst-case prediction. Open challenges are also identified.