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Register a new userImproved Lower Bounds for Truthful Scheduling
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Shahar Dobzinski
Publication date
2020
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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The problem of scheduling unrelated machines by a truthful mechanism to minimize the makespan was introduced in the seminal Algorithmic Mechanism Design paper by Nisan and Ronen. Nisan and Ronen showed that there is a truthful mechanism that provides an approximation ratio of $min(m,n)$, where $n$ is the number of machines and $m$ is the number of jobs. They also proved that no truthful mechanism can provide an approximation ratio better than $2$. Since then, the lower bound was improved to $1 +sqrt 2 approx 2.41$ by Christodoulou, Kotsoupias, and Vidali, and then to $1+phiapprox 2.618$ by Kotsoupias and Vidali. Very recently, the lower bound was improved to $2.755$ by Giannakopoulos, Hammerl, and Pocas. In this paper we further improve the bound to $3-delta$, for every constant $delta>0$. Note that a gap between the upper bound and the lower bounds exists even when the number of machines and jobs is very small. In particular, the known $1+sqrt{2}$ lower bound requires at least $3$ machines and $5$ jobs. In contrast, we show a lower bound of $2.2055$ that uses only $3$ machines and $3$ jobs and a lower bound of $1+sqrt 2$ that uses only $3$ machines and $4$ jobs. For the case of two machines and two jobs we show a lower bound of $2$. Similar bounds for two machines and two jobs were known before but only via complex proofs that characterized all truthful mechanisms that provide a finite approximation ratio in this setting, whereas our new proof uses a simple and direct approach.
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