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Register a new userRussian trolls speaking Russian: Regional Twitter operations and MH17
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Added by
Benjamin Finley
Publication date
2020
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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The role of social media in promoting media pluralism was initially viewed as wholly positive. However, some governments are allegedly manipulating social media by hiring online commentators (also known as trolls) to spread propaganda and disinformation. In particular, an alleged system of professional trolls operating both domestically and internationally exists in Russia. In 2018, Twitter released data on accounts identified as Russian trolls, starting a wave of research. However, while foreign-targeted English language operations of these trolls have received significant attention, no research has analyzed their Russian language domestic and regional-targeted activities. We address this gap by characterizing the Russian-language operations of Russian trolls. We first perform a descriptive analysis, and then focus in on the trolls operation related to the crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17. Among other things, we find that Russian-language trolls have run 163 hashtag campaigns (where hashtag use grows abruptly within a month). The main political sentiments of such campaigns were praising Russia and Putin (29%), criticizing Ukraine (26%), and criticizing the United States and Obama (9%). Further, trolls actively reshared information with 76% of tweets being retweets or containing a URL. Additionally, we observe periodic temporal patterns of tweeting suggesting that trolls use automation tools. Further, we find that trolls information campaign on the MH17 crash was the largest in terms of tweet count. However, around 68% of tweets posted with MH17 hashtags were likely used simply for hashtag amplification. With these tweets excluded, about 49% of the tweets suggested to varying levels that Ukraine was responsible for the crash, and only 13% contained disinformation and propaganda presented as news. Interestingly, trolls promoted inconsistent alternative theories for the crash.
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