Subscribe to the gold package and get unlimited access to Shamra Academy
Register a new userStealing Links from Graph Neural Networks
359
0
0.0
(
0
)
Added by
XInlei He
Publication date
2020
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
Ask ChatGPT about the research
No Arabic abstract
Graph data, such as chemical networks and social networks, may be deemed confidential/private because the data owner often spends lots of resources collecting the data or the data contains sensitive information, e.g., social relationships. Recently, neural networks were extended to graph data, which are known as graph neural networks (GNNs). Due to their superior performance, GNNs have many applications, such as healthcare analytics, recommender systems, and fraud detection. In this work, we propose the first attacks to steal a graph from the outputs of a GNN model that is trained on the graph. Specifically, given a black-box access to a GNN model, our attacks can infer whether there exists a link between any pair of nodes in the graph used to train the model. We call our attacks link stealing attacks. We propose a threat model to systematically characterize an adversarys background knowledge along three dimensions which in total leads to a comprehensive taxonomy of 8 different link stealing attacks. We propose multiple novel methods to realize these 8 attacks. Extensive experiments on 8 real-world datasets show that our attacks are effective at stealing links, e.g., AUC (area under the ROC curve) is above 0.95 in multiple cases. Our results indicate that the outputs of a GNN model reveal rich information about the structure of the graph used to train the model.
rate research
Read More
Deep learning is gaining importance in many applications. However, Neural Networks face several security and privacy threats. This is particularly significant in the scenario where Cloud infrastructures deploy a service with Neural Network model at the back end. Here, an adversary can extract the Neural Network parameters, infer the regularization hyperparameter, identify if a data point was part of the training data, and generate effective transferable adversarial examples to evade classifiers. This paper shows how a Neural Network model is susceptible to timing side channel attack. In this paper, a black box Neural Network extraction attack is proposed by exploiting the timing side channels to infer the depth of the network. Although, constructing an equivalent architecture is a complex search problem, it is shown how Reinforcement Learning with knowledge distillation can effectively reduce the search space to infer a target model. The proposed approach has been tested with VGG architectures on CIFAR10 data set. It is observed that it is possible to reconstruct substitute models with test accuracy close to the target models and the proposed approach is scalable and independent of type of Neural Network architectures.
Botnets are now a major source for many network attacks, such as DDoS attacks and spam. However, most traditional detection methods heavily rely on heuristically designed multi-stage detection criteria. In this paper, we consider the neural network design challenges of using modern deep learning techniques to learn policies for botnet detection automatically. To generate training data, we synthesize botnet connections with different underlying communication patterns overlaid on large-scale real networks as datasets. To capture the important hierarchical structure of centralized botnets and the fast-mixing structure for decentralized botnets, we tailor graph neural networks (GNN) to detect the properties of these structures. Experimental results show that GNNs are better able to capture botnet structure than previous non-learning methods when trained with appropriate data, and that deeper GNNs are crucial for learning difficult botnet topologies. We believe our data and studies can be useful for both the network security and graph learning communities.
Many learning tasks require us to deal with graph data which contains rich relational information among elements, leading increasing graph neural network (GNN) models to be deployed in industrial products for improving the quality of service. However, they also raise challenges to model authentication. It is necessary to protect the ownership of the GNN models, which motivates us to present a watermarking method to GNN models in this paper. In the proposed method, an Erdos-Renyi (ER) random graph with random node feature vectors and labels is randomly generated as a trigger to train the GNN to be protected together with the normal samples. During model training, the secret watermark is embedded into the label predictions of the ER graph nodes. During model verification, by activating a marked GNN with the trigger ER graph, the watermark can be reconstructed from the output to verify the ownership. Since the ER graph was randomly generated, by feeding it to a non-marked GNN, the label predictions of the graph nodes are random, resulting in a low false alarm rate (of the proposed work). Experimental results have also shown that, the performance of a marked GNN on its original task will not be impaired. Moreover, it is robust against model compression and fine-tuning, which has shown the superiority and applicability.
Many real-world data comes in the form of graphs, such as social networks and protein structure. To fully utilize the information contained in graph data, a new family of machine learning (ML) models, namely graph neural networks (GNNs), has been introduced. Previous studies have shown that machine learning models are vulnerable to privacy attacks. However, most of the current efforts concentrate on ML models trained on data from the Euclidean space, like images and texts. On the other hand, privacy risks stemming from GNNs remain largely unstudied. In this paper, we fill the gap by performing the first comprehensive analysis of node-level membership inference attacks against GNNs. We systematically define the threat models and propose three node-level membership inference attacks based on an adversarys background knowledge. Our evaluation on three GNN structures and four benchmark datasets shows that GNNs are vulnerable to node-level membership inference even when the adversary has minimal background knowledge. Besides, we show that graph density and feature similarity have a major impact on the attacks success. We further investigate two defense mechanisms and the empirical results indicate that these defenses can reduce the attack performance but with moderate utility loss.
Smart contract vulnerability detection draws extensive attention in recent years due to the substantial losses caused by hacker attacks. Existing efforts for contract security analysis heavily rely on rigid rules defined by experts, which are labor-intensive and non-scalable. More importantly, expert-defined rules tend to be error-prone and suffer the inherent risk of being cheated by crafty attackers. Recent researches focus on the symbolic execution and formal analysis of smart contracts for vulnerability detection, yet to achieve a precise and scalable solution. Although several methods have been proposed to detect vulnerabilities in smart contracts, there is still a lack of effort that considers combining expert-defined security patterns with deep neural networks. In this paper, we explore using graph neural networks and expert knowledge for smart contract vulnerability detection. Specifically, we cast the rich control- and data- flow semantics of the source code into a contract graph. To highlight the critical nodes in the graph, we further design a node elimination phase to normalize the graph. Then, we propose a novel temporal message propagation network to extract the graph feature from the normalized graph, and combine the graph feature with designed expert patterns to yield a final detection system. Extensive experiments are conducted on all the smart contracts that have source code in Ethereum and VNT Chain platforms. Empirical results show significant accuracy improvements over the state-of-the-art methods on three types of vulnerabilities, where the detection accuracy of our method reaches 89.15%, 89.02%, and 83.21% for reentrancy, timestamp dependence, and infinite loop vulnerabilities, respectively.
suggested questions
Log in to be able to interact and post comments
comments
Fetching comments
Sign in to be able to follow your search criteria
