Subscribe to the gold package and get unlimited access to Shamra Academy
Register a new userPartially Observed Discrete-Time Risk-Sensitive Mean Field Games
259
0
0.0
(
0
)
Ask ChatGPT about the research
No Arabic abstract
In this paper, we consider discrete-time partially observed mean-field games with the risk-sensitive optimality criterion. We introduce risk-sensitivity behaviour for each agent via an exponential utility function. In the game model, each agent is weakly coupled with the rest of the population through its individual cost and state dynamics via the empirical distribution of states. We establish the mean-field equilibrium in the infinite-population limit using the technique of converting the underlying original partially observed stochastic control problem to a fully observed one on the belief space and the dynamic programming principle. Then, we show that the mean-field equilibrium policy, when adopted by each agent, forms an approximate Nash equilibrium for games with sufficiently many agents. We first consider finite-horizon cost function, and then, discuss extension of the result to infinite-horizon cost in the next-to-last section of the paper.
rate research
Read More
While the topic of mean-field games (MFGs) has a relatively long history, heretofore there has been limited work concerning algorithms for the computation of equilibrium control policies. In this paper, we develop a computable policy iteration algorithm for approximating the mean-field equilibrium in linear-quadratic MFGs with discounted cost. Given the mean-field, each agent faces a linear-quadratic tracking problem, the solution of which involves a dynamical system evolving in retrograde time. This makes the development of forward-in-time algorithm updates challenging. By identifying a structural property of the mean-field update operator, namely that it preserves sequences of a particular form, we develop a forward-in-time equilibrium computation algorithm. Bounds that quantify the accuracy of the computed mean-field equilibrium as a function of the algorithms stopping condition are provided. The optimality of the computed equilibrium is validated numerically. In contrast to the most recent/concurrent results, our algorithm appears to be the first to study infinite-horizon MFGs with non-stationary mean-field equilibria, though with focus on the linear quadratic setting.
In this paper, we study large population multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in the context of discrete-time linear-quadratic mean-field games (LQ-MFGs). Our setting differs from most existing work on RL for MFGs, in that we consider a non-stationary MFG over an infinite horizon. We propose an actor-critic algorithm to iteratively compute the mean-field equilibrium (MFE) of the LQ-MFG. There are two primary challenges: i) the non-stationarity of the MFG induces a linear-quadratic tracking problem, which requires solving a backwards-in-time (non-causal) equation that cannot be solved by standard (causal) RL algorithms; ii) Many RL algorithms assume that the states are sampled from the stationary distribution of a Markov chain (MC), that is, the chain is already mixed, an assumption that is not satisfied for real data sources. We first identify that the mean-field trajectory follows linear dynamics, allowing the problem to be reformulated as a linear quadratic Gaussian problem. Under this reformulation, we propose an actor-critic algorithm that allows samples to be drawn from an unmixed MC. Finite-sample convergence guarantees for the algorithm are then provided. To characterize the performance of our algorithm in multi-agent RL, we have developed an error bound with respect to the Nash equilibrium of the finite-population game.
This paper develops a safety analysis method for stochastic systems that is sensitive to the possibility and severity of rare harmful outcomes. We define risk-sensitive safe sets as sub-level sets of the solution to a non-standard optimal control problem, where a random maximum cost is assessed using the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) functional. The solution to the control problem represents the maximum extent of constraint violation of the state trajectory, averaged over the $alphacdot 100$% worst cases, where $alpha in (0,1]$. This problem is well-motivated but difficult to solve in a tractable fashion because temporal decompositions for risk functionals generally depend on the history of the systems behavior. Our primary theoretical contribution is to derive under-approximations to risk-sensitive safe sets, which are computationally tractable. Our method provides a novel, theoretically guaranteed, parameter-dependent upper bound to the CVaR of a maximum cost without the need to augment the state space. For a fixed parameter value, the solution to only one Markov decision process problem is required to obtain the under-approximations for any family of risk-sensitivity levels. In addition, we propose a second definition for risk-sensitive safe sets and provide a tractable method for their estimation without using a parameter-dependent upper bound. The second definition is expressed in terms of a new coherent risk functional, which is inspired by CVaR. We demonstrate our primary theoretical contribution using numerical examples of a thermostatically controlled load system and a stormwater system.
This paper proposes a safety analysis method that facilitates a tunable balance between the worst-case and risk-neutral perspectives. First, we define a risk-sensitive safe set to specify the degree of safety attained by a stochastic system. This set is defined as a sublevel set of the solution to an optimal control problem that is expressed using the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) measure. This problem does not satisfy Bellmans Principle, thus our next contribution is to show how risk-sensitive safe sets can be under-approximated by the solution to a CVaR-Markov Decision Process. We adopt an existing value iteration algorithm to find an approximate solution to the reduced problem for a class of linear systems. Then, we develop a realistic numerical example of a stormwater system to show that this approach can be applied to non-linear systems. Finally, we compare the CVaR criterion to the exponential disutility criterion. The latter allocates control effort evenly across the cost distribution to reduce variance, while the CVaR criterion focuses control effort on a given worst-case quantile--where it matters most for safety.
We propose and investigate a general class of discrete time and finite state space mean field game (MFG) problems with potential structure. Our model incorporates interactions through a congestion term and a price variable. It also allows hard constraints on the distribution of the agents. We analyze the connection between the MFG problem and two optimal control problems in duality. We present two families of numerical methods and detail their implementation: (i) primal-dual proximal methods (and their extension with nonlinear proximity operators), (ii) the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) and a variant called ADM-G. We give some convergence results. Numerical results are provided for two examples with hard constraints.
Log in to be able to interact and post comments
comments
Fetching comments
Sign in to be able to follow your search criteria
