No Arabic abstract
Personal IoT data is a new economic asset that individuals can trade to generate revenue on the emerging data marketplaces. Typically, marketplaces are centralized systems that raise concerns of privacy, single point of failure, little transparency and involve trusted intermediaries to be fair. Furthermore, the battery-operated IoT devices limit the amount of IoT data to be traded in real-time that affects buyer/seller satisfaction and hence, impacting the sustainability and usability of such a marketplace. This work proposes to utilize blockchain technology to realize a trusted and transparent decentralized marketplace for contract compliance for trading IoT data streams generated by battery-operated IoT devices in real-time. The contribution of this paper is two-fold: (1) we propose an autonomous blockchain-based marketplace equipped with essential functionalities such as agreement framework, pricing model and rating mechanism to create an effective marketplace framework without involving a mediator, (2) we propose a mechanism for selection and allocation of buyers demands on sellers devices under quality and battery constraints. We present a proof-of-concept implementation in Ethereum to demonstrate the feasibility of the framework. We investigated the impact of buyers demand on the battery drainage of the IoT devices under different scenarios through extensive simulations. Our results show that this approach is viable and benefits the seller and buyer for creating a sustainable marketplace model for trading IoT data in real-time from battery-powered IoT devices.
Mobile devices with embedded sensors for data collection and environmental sensing create a basis for a cost-effective approach for data trading. For example, these data can be related to pollution and gas emissions, which can be used to check the compliance with national and international regulations. The current approach for IoT data trading relies on a centralized third-party entity to negotiate between data consumers and data providers, which is inefficient and insecure on a large scale. In comparison, a decentralized approach based on distributed ledger technologies (DLT) enables data trading while ensuring trust, security, and privacy. However, due to the lack of understanding of the communication efficiency between sellers and buyers, there is still a significant gap in benchmarking the data trading protocols in IoT environments. Motivated by this knowledge gap, we introduce a model for DLT-based IoT data trading over the Narrowband Internet of Things (NB-IoT) system, intended to support massive environmental sensing. We characterize the communication efficiency of three basic DLT-based IoT data trading protocols via NB-IoT connectivity in terms of latency and energy consumption. The model and analyses of these protocols provide a benchmark for IoT data trading applications.
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) energy trading can facilitate integration of a large number of small-scale producers and consumers into energy markets. Decentralized management of these new market participants is challenging in terms of market settlement, participant reputation and consideration of grid constraints. This paper proposes a blockchain-enabled framework for P2P energy trading among producer and consumer agents in a smart grid. A fully decentralized market settlement mechanism is designed, which does not rely on a centralized entity to settle the market and encourages producers and consumers to negotiate on energy trading with their nearby agents truthfully. To this end, the electrical distance of agents is considered in the pricing mechanism to encourage agents to trade with their neighboring agents. In addition, a reputation factor is considered for each agent, reflecting its past performance in delivering the committed energy. Before starting the negotiation, agents select their trading partners based on their preferences over the reputation and proximity of the trading partners. An Anonymous Proof of Location (A-PoL) algorithm is proposed that allows agents to prove their location without revealing their real identity. The practicality of the proposed framework is illustrated through several case studies, and its security and privacy are analyzed in detail.
Attracted by the inherent security and privacy protection of the blockchain, incorporating blockchain into Internet of Things (IoT) has been widely studied in these years. However, the mining process requires high computational power, which prevents IoT devices from directly participating in blockchain construction. For this reason, edge computing service is introduced to help build the IoT blockchain, where IoT devices could purchase computational resources from the edge servers. In this paper, we consider the case that IoT devices also have other tasks that need the help of edge servers, such as data analysis and data storage. The profits they can get from these tasks is closely related to the amounts of resources they purchased from the edge servers. In this scenario, IoT devices will allocate their limited budgets to purchase different resources from different edge servers, such that their profits can be maximized. Moreover, edge servers will set best prices such that they can get the biggest benefits. Accordingly, there raise a pricing and budget allocation problem between edge servers and IoT devices. We model the interaction between edge servers and IoT devices as a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game, whose objective is to reach the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE). We prove the existence and uniqueness of the SE point, and design efficient algorithms to reach the SE point. In the end, we verify our model and algorithms by performing extensive simulations, and the results show the correctness and effectiveness of our designs.
Future IoT networks consist of heterogeneous types of IoT devices (with various communication types and energy constraints) which are assumed to belong to an IoT service provider (ISP). To power backscattering-based and wireless-powered devices, the ISP has to contract with an energy service provider (ESP). This article studies the strategic interactions between the ISP and its ESP and their implications on the joint optimal time scheduling and energy trading for heterogeneous devices. To that end, we propose an economic framework using the Stackelberg game to maximize the network throughput and energy efficiency of both the ISP and ESP. Specifically, the ISP leads the game by sending its optimal service time and energy price request (that maximizes its profit) to the ESP. The ESP then optimizes and supplies the transmission power which satisfies the ISPs request (while maximizing ESPs utility). To obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE), we apply a backward induction technique which first derives a closed-form solution for the ESP. Then, to tackle the non-convex optimization problem for the ISP, we leverage the block coordinate descent and convex-concave procedure techniques to design two partitioning schemes (i.e., partial adjustment (PA) and joint adjustment (JA)) to find the optimal energy price and service time that constitute local SEs. Numerical results reveal that by jointly optimizing the energy trading and the time allocation for heterogeneous IoT devices, one can achieve significant improvements in terms of the ISPs profit compared with those of conventional transmission methods. Different tradeoffs between the ESPs and ISPs profits and complexities of the PA/JA schemes can also be numerically tuned. Simulations also show that the obtained local SEs approach the socially optimal welfare when the ISPs benefit per transmitted bit is higher than a given threshold.
This paper initiates the study of demand-aware payment channel networks: offchain cryptocurrency networks whose topology is optimized toward the demand (i.e., financial transactions) it currently serves. In particular, we present a model and optimization framework which allows to compute where to optimally establish virtual payment channels: virtual payment channels allow to avoid intermediaries when routing payments, and hence to reduce fees and latency; however, establishing payment channels also comes at a cost.