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Register a new userAll that Glitters is not Bitcoin -- Unveiling the Centralized Nature of the BTC (IP) Network
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Added by
Sami Ben Mariem
Publication date
2020
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Blockchains are typically managed by peer-to-peer (P2P) networks providing the support and substrate to the so-called distributed ledger (DLT), a replicated, shared, and synchronized data structure, geographically spread across multiple nodes. The Bitcoin (BTC) blockchain is by far the most well known DLT, used to record transactions among peers, based on the BTC digital currency. In this paper, we focus on the network side of the BTC P2P network, analyzing its nodes from a purely network measurements-based approach. We present a BTC crawler able to discover and track the BTC P2P network through active measurements, and use it to analyze its main properties. Through the combined analysis of multiple snapshots of the BTC network as well as by using other publicly available data sources on the BTC network and DLT, we unveil the BTC P2P network, locate its active nodes, study their performance, and track the evolution of the network over the past two years. Among other relevant findings, we show that (i) the size of the BTC network has remained almost constant during the last 12 months - since the major BTC price drop in early 2018, (ii) most of the BTC P2P network resides in US and EU countries, and (iii) despite this western network locality, most of the mining activity and corresponding revenue is controlled by major mining pools located in China. By additionally analyzing the distribution of BTC coins among independent BTC entities (i.e., single BTC addresses or groups of BTC addresses controlled by the same actor), we also conclude that (iv) BTC is very far from being the decentralized and uncontrolled system it is so much advertised to be, with only 4.5% of all the BTC entities holding about 85% of all circulating BTC coins.
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Investors tend to sell their winning investments and hold onto their losers. This phenomenon, known as the emph{disposition effect} in the field of behavioural finance, is well-known and its prevalence has been shown in a number of existing markets. But what about new atypical markets like cryptocurrencies? Do investors act as irrationally as in traditional markets? One might suspect this and hypothesise that cryptocurrency sells occur more frequently in positive market conditions and less frequently in negative market conditions. However, there is still no empirical evidence to support this. In this paper, we expand on existing research and empirically investigate the prevalence of the disposition effect in Bitcoin by testing this hypothesis. Our results show that investors are indeed subject to the disposition effect, tending to sell their winning positions too soon and holding on to their losing position for too long. This effect is very prominently evident from the boom and bust year 2017 onwards, confirmed via most of the applied technical indicators. In this study, we show that Bitcoin traders act just as irrationally as traders in other, more established markets.
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Routing attacks remain practically effective in the Internet today as existing countermeasures either fail to provide protection guarantees or are not easily deployable. Blockchain systems are particularly vulnerable to such attacks as they rely on Internet-wide communication to reach consensus. In particular, Bitcoin -the most widely-used cryptocurrency- can be split in half by any AS-level adversary using BGP hijacking. In this paper, we present SABRE, a secure and scalable Bitcoin relay network which relays blocks worldwide through a set of connections that are resilient to routing attacks. SABRE runs alongside the existing peer-to-peer network and is easily deployable. As a critical system, SABRE design is highly resilient and can efficiently handle high bandwidth loads, including Denial of Service attacks. We built SABRE around two key technical insights. First, we leverage fundamental properties of inter-domain routing (BGP) policies to host relay nodes: (i) in locations that are inherently protected against routing attacks; and (ii) on paths that are economically preferred by the majority of Bitcoin clients. These properties are generic and can be used to protect other Blockchain-based systems. Second, we leverage the fact that relaying blocks is communication-heavy, not computation-heavy. This enables us to offload most of the relay operations to programmable network hardware (using the P4 programming language). Thanks to this hardware/software co-design, SABRE nodes operate seamlessly under high load while mitigating the effects of malicious clients. We present a complete implementation of SABRE together with an extensive evaluation. Our results demonstrate that SABRE is effective at securing Bitcoin against routing attacks, even with deployments as small as 6 nodes.
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