Subscribe to the gold package and get unlimited access to Shamra Academy
Register a new userDepth penetration and scope extension of failures in the cascading of multilayer networks
59
0
0.0
(
0
)
Ask ChatGPT about the research
No Arabic abstract
Real-world complex systems always interact with each other, which causes these systems to collapse in an avalanche or cascading manner in the case of random failures or malicious attacks. The robustness of multilayer networks has attracted great interest, where the modeling and theoretical studies of which always rely on the concept of multilayer networks and percolation methods. A straightforward and tacit assumption is that the interdependence across network layers is strong, which means that a node will fail entirely with the removal of all links if one of its interdependent neighbours fails. However, this oversimplification cannot describe the general form of interactions across the network layers in a real-world multilayer system. In this paper, we reveal the nature of the avalanche disintegration of general multilayer networks with arbitrary interdependency strength across network layers. Specifically, we identify that the avalanche process of the whole system can essentially be decomposed into two microscopic cascading dynamics in terms of the propagation direction of the failures: depth penetration and scope extension. In the process of depth penetration, the failures propagate from layer to layer, where the greater the number of failed nodes is, the greater the destructive power that will emerge in an interdependency group. In the process of scope extension, failures propagate with the removal of connections in each network layer. Under the synergy of the two processes, we find that the percolation transition of the system can be discontinuous or continuous with changes in the interdependency strength across network layers, which means that sudden system-wide collapse can be avoided by controlling the interdependency strength across network layers.
rate research
Read More
Cascading failure is a potentially devastating process that spreads on real-world complex networks and can impact the integrity of wide-ranging infrastructures, natural systems, and societal cohesiveness. One of the essential features that create complex network vulnerability to failure propagation is the dependency among their components, exposing entire systems to significant risks from destabilizing hazards such as human attacks, natural disasters or internal breakdowns. Developing realistic models for cascading failures as well as strategies to halt and mitigate the failure propagation can point to new approaches to restoring and strengthening real-world networks. In this review, we summarize recent progress on models developed based on physics and complex network science to understand the mechanisms, dynamics and overall impact of cascading failures. We present models for cascading failures in single networks and interdependent networks and explain how different dynamic propagation mechanisms can lead to an abrupt collapse and a rich dynamic behavior. Finally, we close the review with novel emerging strategies for containing cascades of failures and discuss open questions that remain to be addressed.
Cascading failures constitute an important vulnerability of interconnected systems. Here we focus on the study of such failures on networks in which the connectivity of nodes is constrained by geographical distance. Specifically, we use random geometric graphs as representative examples of such spatial networks, and study the properties of cascading failures on them in the presence of distributed flow. The key finding of this study is that the process of cascading failures is non-self-averaging on spatial networks, and thus, aggregate inferences made from analyzing an ensemble of such networks lead to incorrect conclusions when applied to a single network, no matter how large the network is. We demonstrate that this lack of self-averaging disappears with the introduction of a small fraction of long-range links into the network. We simulate the well studied preemptive node removal strategy for cascade mitigation and show that it is largely ineffective in the case of spatial networks. We introduce an altruistic strategy designed to limit the loss of network nodes in the event of a cascade triggering failure and show that it performs better than the preemptive strategy. Finally, we consider a real-world spatial network viz. a European power transmission network and validate that our findings from the study of random geometric graphs are also borne out by simulations of cascading failures on the empirical network.
The structure of real-world multilayer infrastructure systems usually exhibits anisotropy due to constraints of the embedding space. For example, geographical features like mountains, rivers and shores influence the architecture of critical infrastructure networks. Moreover, such spatial networks are often non-homogeneous but rather have a modular structure with dense connections within communities and sparse connections between neighboring communities. When the networks of the different layers are interdependent, local failures and attacks may propagate throughout the system. Here we study the robustness of spatial interdependent networks which are both anisotropic and heterogeneous. We also evaluate the effect of localized attacks having different geometrical shapes. We find that anisotropic networks are more robust against localized attacks and that anisotropic attacks, surprisingly, even on isotropic structures, are more effective than isotropic attacks.
In todays global economy, supply chain (SC) entities have become increasingly interconnected with demand and supply relationships due to the need for strategic outsourcing. Such interdependence among firms not only increases efficiency but also creates more vulnerabilities in the system. Natural and human-made disasters such as floods and transport accidents may halt operations and lead to economic losses. Due to the interdependence among firms, the adverse effects of any disruption can be amplified and spread throughout the systems. This paper aims at studying the robustness of SC networks against cascading failures. Considering the upper and lower bound load constraints, i.e., inventory and cost, we examine the fraction of failed entities under load decrease and load fluctuation scenarios. The simulation results obtained from synthetic networks and a European supply chain network [1] both confirm that the recovery strategies of surplus inventory and backup suppliers often adopted in actual SCs can enhance the system robustness, compared with the system without the recovery process. In addition, the system is relatively robust against load fluctuations but is more fragile to demand shocks. For the underload-driven model without the recovery process, we found an occurrence of a discontinuous phase transition. Differently from other systems studied under overload cascading failures, this system is more robust for power-law distributions than uniform distributions of the lower bound parameter for the studied scenarios.
We present a cascading failure model of two interdependent networks in which functional nodes belong to components of size greater than or equal to $s$. We find theoretically and via simulation that in complex networks with random dependency links the transition is first-order for $sgeq 3$ and second-order for $s=2$. We find for two square lattices with a distance constraint $r$ in the dependency links that increasing $r$ moves the system from a regime without a phase transition to one with a second-order transition. As $r$ continues to increase the system collapses in a first-order transition. Each regime is associated with a different structure of domain formation of functional nodes.
Log in to be able to interact and post comments
comments
Fetching comments
Sign in to be able to follow your search criteria
