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Register a new userA Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Social Impact of Connected and Automated Vehicles
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Ioannis Chremos
Publication date
2019
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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In this paper, we address the much-anticipated deployment of connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) in society by modeling and analyzing the social-mobility dilemma in a game-theoretic approach. We formulate this dilemma as a normal-form game of players making a binary decision: whether to travel with a CAV (CAV travel) or not (non-CAV travel) and by constructing an intuitive payoff function inspired by the socially beneficial outcomes of a mobility system consisting of CAVs. We show that the game is equivalent to the Prisoners dilemma, which implies that the rational collective decision is the opposite of the socially optimum. We present two different solutions to tackle this phenomenon: one with a preference structure and the other with institutional arrangements. In the first approach, we implement a social mechanism that incentivizes players to non-CAV travel and derive a lower bound on the players that ensures an equilibrium of non-CAV travel. In the second approach, we investigate the possibility of players bargaining to create an institution that enforces non-CAV travel and show that as the number of players increases, the incentive ratio of non-CAV travel over CAV travel tends to zero. We conclude by showcasing the last result with a numerical study.
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The operation of future intelligent transportation systems (ITSs), communications infrastructure (CI), and power grids (PGs) will be highly interdependent. In particular, autonomous connected vehicles require CI resources to operate, and, thus, communication failures can result in non-optimality in the ITS flow in terms of traffic jams and fuel consumption. Similarly, CI components, e.g., base stations (BSs) can be impacted by failures in the electric grid that is powering them. Thus, malicious attacks on the PG can lead to failures in both the CI and the ITSs. To this end, in this paper, the security of an ITS against indirect attacks carried out through the PG is studied in an interdependent PG-CI-ITS scenario. To defend against such attacks, the administrator of the interdependent critical infrastructure can allocate backup power sources (BPSs) at every BS to compensate for the power loss caused by the attacker. However, due to budget limitations, the administrator must consider the importance of each BS in light of the PG risk of failure, while allocating the BPSs. In this regard, a rigorous analytical framework is proposed to model the interdependencies between the ITS, CI, and PG. Next, a one-to-one relationship between the PG components and ITS streets is derived in order to capture the effect of the PG components failure on the optimality of the traffic flow in the streets. Moreover, the problem of BPS allocation is formulated using a Stackelberg game framework and the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the game is characterized. Simulation results show that the derived SE outperforms any other BPS allocation strategy and can be scalable in linear time with respect to the size of the interdependent infrastructure.
Connected and automated vehicles have shown great potential in improving traffic mobility and reducing emissions, especially at unsignalized intersections. Previous research has shown that vehicle passing order is the key influencing factor in improving intersection traffic mobility. In this paper, we propose a graph-based cooperation method to formalize the conflict-free scheduling problem at an unsignalized intersection. Based on graphical analysis, a vehicles trajectory conflict relationship is modeled as a conflict directed graph and a coexisting undirected graph. Then, two graph-based methods are proposed to find the vehicle passing order. The first is an improved depth-first spanning tree algorithm, which aims to find the local optimal passing order vehicle by vehicle. The other novel method is a minimum clique cover algorithm, which identifies the global optimal solution. Finally, a distributed control framework and communication topology are presented to realize the conflict-free cooperation of vehicles. Extensive numerical simulations are conducted for various numbers of vehicles and traffic volumes, and the simulation results prove the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.
A hybrid simulation-based framework involving system dynamics and agent-based simulation is proposed to address duopoly game considering multiple strategic decision variables and rich payoff, which cannot be addressed by traditional approaches involving closed-form equations. While system dynamics models are used to represent integrated production, logistics, and pricing determination activities of duopoly companies, agent-based simulation is used to mimic enhanced consumer purchasing behavior considering advertisement, promotion effect, and acquaintance recommendation in the consumer social network. The payoff function of the duopoly companies is assumed to be the net profit based on the total revenue and various cost items such as raw material, production, transportation, inventory and backorder. A unique procedure is proposed to solve and analyze the proposed simulation-based game, where the procedural components include strategy refinement, data sampling, gaming solving, and performance evaluation. First, design of experiment and estimated conformational value of information techniques are employed for strategy refinement and data sampling, respectively. Game solving then focuses on pure strategy equilibriums, and performance evaluation addresses game stability, equilibrium strictness, and robustness. A hypothetical case scenario involving soft-drink duopoly on Coke and Pepsi is considered to illustrate and demonstrate the proposed approach. Final results include P-values of statistical tests, confidence intervals, and simulation steady state analysis for different pure equilibriums.
We propose a fully distributed control system architecture, amenable to in-vehicle implementation, that aims to safely coordinate connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) in road intersections. For control purposes, we build upon a fully distributed model predictive control approach, in which the agents solve a nonconvex optimal control problem (OCP) locally and synchronously, and exchange their optimized trajectories via vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication. To accommodate a fast solution of the nonconvex OCPs, we apply the penalty convex-concave procedure which aims to solve a convexified version of the original OCP. For experimental evaluation, we complement the predictive controller with a localization layer, being in charge of self-localization and the estimation of joint collision points with other agents. Moreover, we come up with a proprietary communication protocol to exchange trajectories with other agents. Experimental tests reveal the efficacy of proposed control system architecture.
Low transaction throughput and poor scalability are significant issues in public blockchain consensus protocols such as Bitcoins. Recent research efforts in this direction have proposed shard-based consensus protocols where the key idea is to split the transactions among multiple committees (or shards), which then process these shards or set of transactions in parallel. Such a parallel processing of disjoint sets of transactions or shards by multiple committees significantly improves the overall scalability and transaction throughout of the system. However, one significant research gap is a lack of understanding of the strategic behavior of rational processors within committees in such shard-based consensus protocols. Such an understanding is critical for designing appropriate incentives that will foster cooperation within committees and prevent free-riding. In this paper, we address this research gap by analyzing the behavior of processors using a game-theoretic model, where each processor aims at maximizing its reward at a minimum cost of participating in the protocol. We first analyze the Nash equilibria in an N-player static game model of the sharding protocol. We show that depending on the reward sharing approach employed, processors can potentially increase their payoff by unilaterally behaving in a defective fashion, thus resulting in a social dilemma. In order to overcome this social dilemma, we propose a novel incentive-compatible reward sharing mechanism to promote cooperation among processors. Our numerical results show that achieving a majority of cooperating processors (required to ensure a healthy state of the blockchain network) is easier to achieve with the proposed incentive-compatible reward sharing mechanism than with other reward sharing mechanisms.
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