No Arabic abstract
This paper proposes a market clearing mechanism for energy trading in a local transactive market, where each player can participate in the market as seller or buyer and tries to maximize its welfare individually. Market players send their demand and supply to a local data center, where clearing price is determined to balance demand and supply. The topology of the grid and associated network constraints are considered to compute a price signal in the data center to keep the system secure by applying this signal to the corresponding players. The proposed approach needs only the demanded/supplied power by each player to reach global optimum which means that utility and cost function parameters would remain private. Also, this approach uses distributed method by applying local market clearing price as coordination information and direct load flow (DLF) for power flow calculation saving computation resources and making it suitable for online and automatic operation for a market with a large number of players. The proposed method is tested on a market with 50 players and simulation results show that the convergence is guaranteed and the proposed distributed method can reach the same result as conventional centralized approach.
Recent innovations in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) provide new opportunities and challenges for integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) into the energy supply system as active market players. By increasing integration of DERs, novel market platform should be designed for these new market players. The designed electricity market should maximize market surplus for consumers and suppliers and provide correct incentives for them to join the market and follow market rules. In this paper, a feeder-based market is proposed for local energy trading among prosumers and consumers in the distribution system. In this market, market players are allowed to share energy with other players in the local market and with neighborhood areas. A Two-StepMarket Clearing (2SMC) mechanism is proposed for market clearing, in which in the first step, each local market is cleared independently to determine the market clearing price and in the second step, players can trade energy with neighborhood areas. In comparison to a centralized market, the proposed method is scalable and reduces computation overheads, because instead of clearing market for a large number of players, the market is cleared for a fewer number of players. Also, by applying distributed method and Lagrangian multipliers for market clearing, there is no need for a central computation centre and private information of market players. Case studies demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed market clearing method in increasing social welfare and reducing computation time.
This paper designs a market platform for Peer-to-Peer (P2P) energy trading in Transactive Energy (TE) systems, where prosumers and consumers actively participate in the market as seller or buyer to trade energy. An auction-based approach is used for market clearing in the proposed platform and a review of different types of auction is performed. The appropriate auction approach for market clearing in the proposed platform is designed. The proposed auction mechanism is implemented in three steps namely determination, allocation and payment. This paper identifies important P2P market clearing performance indices, which are used to compare and contrast the designed auction with different types of auction mechanisms. Comparative studies demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed auction mechanism for market clearing in the P2P platform.
We consider a two-stage electricity market comprising a forward and a real-time settlement. The former pre-dispatches the power system following a least-cost merit order and facing an uncertain net demand, while the latter copes with the plausible deviations with respect to the forward schedule by making use of power regulation during the actual operation of the system. Standard industry practice deals with the uncertain net demand in the forward stage by replacing it with a good estimate of its conditional expectation (usually referred to as a point forecast), so as to minimize the need for power regulation in real time. However, it is well known that the cost structure of a power system is highly asymmetric and dependent on its operating point, with the result that minimizing the amount of power imbalances is not necessarily aligned with minimizing operating costs. In this paper, we propose a mixed-integer program to construct, from the available historical data, an alternative estimate of the net demand that accounts for the power systems cost asymmetry. Furthermore, to accommodate the strong dependence of this cost on the power systems operating point, we use clustering to tailor the proposed estimate to the foreseen net-demand regime. By way of an illustrative example and a more realistic case study based on the European power system, we show that our approach leads to substantial cost savings compared to the customary way of doing.
Future electricity distribution grids will host a considerable share of the renewable energy sources needed for enforcing the energy transition. Demand side management mechanisms play a key role in the integration of such renewable energy resources by exploiting the flexibility of elastic loads, generation or electricity storage technologies. In particular, local energy markets enable households to exchange energy with each other while increasing the amount of renewable energy that is consumed locally. Nevertheless, as most ex-ante mechanisms, local market schedules rely on hour-ahead forecasts whose accuracy may be low. In this paper we cope with forecast errors by proposing a game theory approach to model the interactions among prosumers and distribution system operators for the control of electricity flows in real-time. The presented game has an aggregative equilibrium which can be attained in a semi-distributed manner, driving prosumers towards a final exchange of energy with the grid that benefits both households and operators, favoring the enforcement of prosumers local market commitments while respecting the constraints defined by the operator. The proposed mechanism requires only one-to-all broadcast of price signals, which do not depend either on the amount of players or their local objective function and constraints, making the approach highly scalable. Its impact on distribution grid quality of supply was evaluated through load flow analysis and realistic load profiles, demonstrating the capacity of the mechanism ensure that voltage deviation and thermal limit constraints are respected.
Using a data set which includes all transactions among banks in the Italian money market, we study their trading strategies and the dependence among them. We use the Fourier method to compute the variance-covariance matrix of trading strategies. Our results indicate that well defined patterns arise. Two main communities of banks, which can be coarsely identified as small and large banks, emerge.