Subscribe to the gold package and get unlimited access to Shamra Academy
Register a new userBuild and Execution Environment (BEE): an Encapsulated Environment Enabling HPC Applications Running Everywhere
166
0
0.0
(
0
)
Added by
Jieyang Chen
Publication date
2017
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
Ask ChatGPT about the research
No Arabic abstract
Variations in High Performance Computing (HPC) system software configurations mean that applications are typically configured and built for specific HPC environments. Building applications can require a significant investment of time and effort for application users and requires application users to have additional technical knowledge. Linux container technologies such as Docker and Charliecloud bring great benefits to the application development, build and deployment processes. While cloud platforms already widely support containers, HPC systems still have non-uniform support of container technologies. In this work, we propose a unified runtime framework -- Build and Execution Environment (BEE) across both HPC and cloud platforms that allows users to run their containerized HPC applications across all supported platforms without modification. We design four BEE backends for four different classes of HPC or cloud platform so that together they cover the majority of mainstream computing platforms for HPC users. Evaluations show that BEE provides an easy-to-use unified user interface, execution environment, and comparable performance.
rate research
Read More
With the growing complexity of computational and experimental facilities, many scientific researchers are turning to machine learning (ML) techniques to analyze large scale ensemble data. With complexities such as multi-component workflows, heterogeneous machine architectures, parallel file systems, and batch scheduling, care must be taken to facilitate this analysis in a high performance computing (HPC) environment. In this paper, we present Merlin, a workflow framework to enable large ML-friendly ensembles of scientific HPC simulations. By augmenting traditional HPC with distributed compute technologies, Merlin aims to lower the barrier for scientific subject matter experts to incorporate ML into their analysis. In addition to its design, we describe some example applications that Merlin has enabled on leadership-class HPC resources, such as the ML-augmented optimization of nuclear fusion experiments and the calibration of infectious disease models to study the progression of and possible mitigation strategies for COVID-19.
ARM TrustZone is the de-facto hardware TEE implementation on mobile devices like smartphones. As a vendor-centric TEE, TrustZone greatly overlooks the strong protection demands and requirements from the App developers. Several security solutions have been proposed to enable the TEE-assisted isolation in the Normal World of ARM, attempting to balance the security and usability. However, they are still not full-fledged in serving Apps needs. In this paper, we introduce LEAP, which is a lightweight App developer Centric TEE solution in the Normal World. LEAP offers the auto DevOps tool to help developers to prepare the codes running on it, enables isolated codes to execute in parallel and access peripheral (e.g. mobile GPUs) with ease, and dynamically manage system resources upon Apps requests. We implement the LEAP prototype on the off-the-shelf ARM platform without any hardware change. We perform the comprehensive analyses and experiments to demonstrate that LEAP is efficient in design, comprehensive in support, and convenient in adoption.
Data privacy is unarguably of extreme importance. Nonetheless, there exist various daunting challenges to safe-guarding data privacy. These challenges stem from the fact that data owners have little control over their data once it has transgressed their local storage and been managed by third parties whose trustworthiness is questionable at times. Our work seeks to enhance data privacy by constructing a self-expiring data capsule. Sensitive data is encapsulated into a capsule which is associated with an access policy an expiring condition. The former indicates eligibility of functions that can access the data, and the latter dictates when the data should become inaccessible to anyone, including the previously eligible functions. Access to the data capsule, as well as its dismantling once the expiring condition is met, are governed by a committee of independent and mutually distrusting nodes. The pivotal contribution of our work is an integration of hardware primitive, state machine replication and threshold secret sharing in the design of the self-expiring data encapsulation framework. We implement the proposed framework in a system called TEEKAP. Our empirical experiments conducted on a realistic deployment setting with the access control committee spanning across four geographical regions reveal that TEEKAP can process access requests at scale with sub-second latency.
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are used to protect sensitive data and run secure execution for security-critical applications, by providing an environment isolated from the rest of the system. However, over the last few years, TEEs have been proven weak, as either TEEs built upon security-oriented hardware extensions (e.g., Arm TrustZone) or resorting to dedicated secure elements were exploited multiple times. In this project, we introduce Trusted Execution Environments On-Demand (TEEOD), a novel TEE design that leverages the programmable logic (PL) in the heterogeneous system on chips (SoC) as the secure execution environment. Unlike other TEE designs, TEEOD can provide high-bandwidth connections and physical on-chip isolation. We implemented a proof-of-concept (PoC) implementation targeting an Ultra96-V2 platform. The conducted evaluation demonstrated TEEOD can host up to 6 simultaneous enclaves with a resource usage per enclave of 7.0%, 3.8%, and 15.3% of the total LUTs, FFs, and BRAMS, respectively. To demonstrate the practicability of TEEOD in real-world applications, we successfully run a legacy open-source Bitcoin wallet.
In-storage computing with modern solid-state drives (SSDs) enables developers to offload programs from the host to the SSD. It has been proven to be an effective approach to alleviate the I/O bottleneck. To facilitate in-storage computing, many frameworks have been proposed. However, few of them treat the in-storage security as the first citizen. Specifically, since modern SSD controllers do not have a trusted execution environment, an offloaded (malicious) program could steal, modify, and even destroy the data stored in the SSD. In this paper, we first investigate the attacks that could be conducted by offloaded in-storage programs. To defend against these attacks, we build a lightweight trusted execution environment, named IceClave for in-storage computing. IceClave enables security isolation between in-storage programs and flash management functions that include flash address translation, data access control, and garbage collection, with TrustZone extensions. IceClave also achieves security isolation between in-storage programs by enforcing memory integrity verification of in-storage DRAM with low overhead. To protect data loaded from flash chips, IceClave develops a lightweight data encryption/decryption mechanism in flash controllers. We develop IceClave with a full system simulator. We evaluate IceClave with a variety of data-intensive applications such as databases. Compared to state-of-the-art in-storage computing approaches, IceClave introduces only 7.6% performance overhead, while enforcing security isolation in the SSD controller with minimal hardware cost. IceClave still keeps the performance benefit of in-storage computing by delivering up to 2.31$times$ better performance than the conventional host-based trusted computing approach.
Log in to be able to interact and post comments
comments
Fetching comments
Sign in to be able to follow your search criteria
