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Register a new userThe impact of a network split on cascading failure processes
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Cascading failure models are typically used to capture the phenomenon where failures possibly trigger further failures in succession, causing knock-on effects. In many networks this ultimately leads to a disintegrated network where the failure propagation continues independently across the various components. In order to gain insight in the impact of network splitting on cascading failure processes, we extend a well-established cascading failure model for which the number of failures obeys a power-law distribution. We assume that a single line failure immediately splits the network in two components, and examine its effect on the power-law exponent. The results provide valuable qualitative insights that are crucial first steps towards understanding more complex network splitting scenarios.
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Knowledge of power grids topology during cascading failure is an essential element of centralized blackout prevention control, given that multiple islands are typically formed, as a cascade progresses. Moreover, academic research on interdependency between cyber and physical layers of the grid indicate that power failure during a cascade may lead to outages in communication networks, which progressively reduce the observable areas. These challenge the current literature on line outage detection, which assumes that the grid remains as a single connected component. We propose a new approach to eliminate that assumption. Following an islanding event, first the buses forming that connected components are identified and then further line outages within the individual islands are detected. In addition to the power system measurements, observable breaker statuses are integrated as constraints in our topology identification algorithm. The impact of error propagation on the estimation process as reliance on previous estimates keeps growing during cascade is also studied. Finally, the estimated admittance matrix is used in preventive control of cascading failure, creating a closed-loop system. The impact of such an interlinked estimation and control on that total load served is studied for the first time. Simulations in IEEE-118 bus system and 2,383-bus Polish network demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.
Power system cascading failures become more time variant and complex because of the increasing network interconnection and higher renewable energy penetration. High computational cost is the main obstacle for a more frequent online cascading failure search, which is essential to improve system security. In this work, we show that the complex mechanism of cascading failures can be well captured by training a graph convolutional network (GCN) offline. Subsequently, the search of cascading failures can be significantly accelerated with the aid of the trained GCN model. We link the power network topology with the structure of the GCN, yielding a smaller parameter space to learn the complex mechanism. We further enable the interpretability of the GCN model by a layer-wise relevance propagation (LRP) algorithm. The proposed method is tested on both the IEEE RTS-79 test system and Chinas Henan Province power system. The results show that the GCN guided method can not only accelerate the search of cascading failures, but also reveal the reasons for predicting the potential cascading failures.
This paper re-introduces the network reliability polynomial - introduced by Moore and Shannon in 1956 -- for studying the effect of network structure on the spread of diseases. We exhibit a representation of the polynomial that is well-suited for estimation by distributed simulation. We describe a collection of graphs derived from ErdH{o}s-Renyi and scale-free-like random graphs in which we have manipulated assortativity-by-degree and the number of triangles. We evaluate the network reliability for all these graphs under a reliability rule that is related to the expected size of a connected component. Through these extensive simulations, we show that for positively or neutrally assortative graphs, swapping edges to increase the number of triangles does not increase the network reliability. Also, positively assortative graphs are more reliable than neutral or disassortative graphs with the same number of edges. Moreover, we show the combined effect of both assortativity-by-degree and the presence of triangles on the critical point and the size of the smallest subgraph that is reliable.
Many real-world complex systems across natural, social, and economical domains consist of manifold layers to form multiplex networks. The multiple network layers give rise to nonlinear effect for the emergent dynamics of systems. Especially, weak layers that can potentially play significant role in amplifying the vulnerability of multiplex networks might be shadowed in the aggregated single-layer network framework which indiscriminately accumulates all layers. Here we present a simple model of cascading failure on multiplex networks of weight-heterogeneous layers. By simulating the model on the multiplex network of international trades, we found that the multiplex model produces more catastrophic cascading failures which are the result of emergent collective effect of coupling layers, rather than the simple sum thereof. Therefore risks can be systematically underestimated in single-layer network analyses because the impact of weak layers can be overlooked. We anticipate that our simple theoretical study can contribute to further investigation and design of optimal risk-averse real-world complex systems.
We study cascading failures in networks using a dynamical flow model based on simple conservation and distribution laws to investigate the impact of transient dynamics caused by the rebalancing of loads after an initial network failure (triggering event). It is found that considering the flow dynamics may imply reduced network robustness compared to previous static overload failure models. This is due to the transient oscillations or overshooting in the loads, when the flow dynamics adjusts to the new (remaining) network structure. We obtain {em upper} and {em lower} limits to network robustness, and it is shown that {it two} time scales $tau$ and $tau_0$, defined by the network dynamics, are important to consider prior to accurately addressing network robustness or vulnerability. The robustness of networks showing cascading failures is generally determined by a complex interplay between the network topology and flow dynamics, where the ratio $chi=tau/tau_0$ determines the relative role of the two of them.
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