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Register a new userSecuring Wireless Communications of the Internet of Things from the Physical Layer, An Overview
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Added by
Junqing Zhang
Publication date
2017
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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The security of the Internet of Things (IoT) is receiving considerable interest as the low power constraints and complexity features of many IoT devices are limiting the use of conventional cryptographic techniques. This article provides an overview of recent research efforts on alternative approaches for securing IoT wireless communications at the physical layer, specifically the key topics of key generation and physical layer encryption. These schemes can be implemented and are lightweight, and thus offer practical solutions for providing effective IoT wireless security. Future research to make IoT-based physical layer security more robust and pervasive is also covered.
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