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Register a new userPrivacy through Fake yet Semantically Real Traces
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Added by
Reza Shokri
Publication date
2015
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Camouflaging data by generating fake information is a well-known obfuscation technique for protecting data privacy. In this paper, we focus on a very sensitive and increasingly exposed type of data: location data. There are two main scenarios in which fake traces are of extreme value to preserve location privacy: publishing datasets of location trajectories, and using location-based services. Despite advances in protecting (location) data privacy, there is no quantitative method to evaluate how realistic a synthetic trace is, and how much utility and privacy it provides in each scenario. Also, the lack of a methodology to generate privacy-preserving fake traces is evident. In this paper, we fill this gap and propose the first statistical metric and model to generate fake location traces such that both the utility of data and the privacy of users are preserved. We build upon the fact that, although geographically they visit distinct locations, people have strongly semantically similar mobility patterns, for example, their transition pattern across activities (e.g., working, driving, staying at home) is similar. We define a statistical metric and propose an algorithm that automatically discovers the hidden semantic similarities between locations from a bag of real location traces as seeds, without requiring any initial semantic annotations. We guarantee that fake traces are geographically dissimilar to their seeds, so they do not leak sensitive location information. We also protect contributors to seed traces against membership attacks. Interleaving fake traces with mobile users traces is a prominent location privacy defense mechanism. We quantitatively show the effectiveness of our methodology in protecting against localization inference attacks while preserving utility of sharing/publishing traces.
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In recent years, generative adversarial networks (GANs) and its variants have achieved unprecedented success in image synthesis. They are widely adopted in synthesizing facial images which brings potential security concerns to humans as the fakes spread and fuel the misinformation. However, robust detectors of these AI-synthesized fake faces are still in their infancy and are not ready to fully tackle this emerging challenge. In this work, we propose a novel approach, named FakeSpotter, based on monitoring neuron behaviors to spot AI-synthesized fake faces. The studies on neuron coverage and interactions have successfully shown that they can be served as testing criteria for deep learning systems, especially under the settings of being exposed to adversarial attacks. Here, we conjecture that monitoring neuron behavior can also serve as an asset in detecting fake faces since layer-by-layer neuron activation patterns may capture more subtle features that are important for the fake detector. Experimental results on detecting four types of fake faces synthesized with the state-of-the-art GANs and evading four perturbation attacks show the effectiveness and robustness of our approach.
Federated learning enables mutually distrusting participants to collaboratively learn a distributed machine learning model without revealing anything but the models output. Generic federated learning has been studied extensively, and several learning protocols, as well as open-source frameworks, have been developed. Yet, their over pursuit of computing efficiency and fast implementation might diminish the security and privacy guarantees of participants training data, about which little is known thus far. In this paper, we consider an honest-but-curious adversary who participants in training a distributed ML model, does not deviate from the defined learning protocol, but attempts to infer private training data from the legitimately received information. In this setting, we design and implement two practical attacks, reverse sum attack and reverse multiplication attack, neither of which will affect the accuracy of the learned model. By empirically studying the privacy leakage of two learning protocols, we show that our attacks are (1) effective - the adversary successfully steal the private training data, even when the intermediate outputs are encrypted to protect data privacy; (2) evasive - the adversarys malicious behavior does not deviate from the protocol specification and deteriorate any accuracy of the target model; and (3) easy - the adversary needs little prior knowledge about the data distribution of the target participant. We also experimentally show that the leaked information is as effective as the raw training data through training an alternative classifier on the leaked information. We further discuss potential countermeasures and their challenges, which we hope may lead to several promising research directions.
As machine learning becomes a practice and commodity, numerous cloud-based services and frameworks are provided to help customers develop and deploy machine learning applications. While it is prevalent to outsource model training and serving tasks in the cloud, it is important to protect the privacy of sensitive samples in the training dataset and prevent information leakage to untrusted third parties. Past work have shown that a malicious machine learning service provider or end user can easily extract critical information about the training samples, from the model parameters or even just model outputs. In this paper, we propose a novel and generic methodology to preserve the privacy of training data in machine learning applications. Specifically we introduce an obfuscate function and apply it to the training data before feeding them to the model training task. This function adds random noise to existing samples, or augments the dataset with new samples. By doing so sensitive information about the properties of individual samples, or statistical properties of a group of samples, is hidden. Meanwhile the model trained from the obfuscated dataset can still achieve high accuracy. With this approach, the customers can safely disclose the data or models to third-party providers or end users without the need to worry about data privacy. Our experiments show that this approach can effective defeat four existing types of machine learning privacy attacks at negligible accuracy cost.
With the widespread use of LBSs (Location-based Services), synthesizing location traces plays an increasingly important role in analyzing spatial big data while protecting user privacy. In particular, a synthetic trace that preserves a feature specific to a cluster of users (e.g., those who commute by train, those who go shopping) is important for various geo-data analysis tasks and for providing a synthetic location dataset. Although location synthesizers have been widely studied, existing synthesizers do not provide sufficient utility, privacy, or scalability, hence are not practical for large-scale location traces. To overcome this issue, we propose a novel location synthesizer called PPMTF (Privacy-Preserving Multiple Tensor Factorization). We model various statistical features of the original traces by a transition-count tensor and a visit-count tensor. We factorize these two tensors simultaneously via multiple tensor factorization, and train factor matrices via posterior sampling. Then we synthesize traces from reconstructed tensors, and perform a plausible deniability test for a synthetic trace. We comprehensively evaluate PPMTF using two datasets. Our experimental results show that PPMTF preserves various statistical features including cluster-specific features, protects user privacy, and synthesizes large-scale location traces in practical time. PPMTF also significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art methods in terms of utility and scalability at the same level of privacy.
Location privacy has been extensively studied in the literature. However, existing location privacy models are either not rigorous or not customizable, which limits the trade-off between privacy and utility in many real-world applications. To address this issue, we propose a new location privacy notion called PGLP, i.e., textit{Policy Graph based Location Privacy}, providing a rich interface to release private locations with customizable and rigorous privacy guarantee. First, we design the privacy metrics of PGLP by extending differential privacy. Specifically, we formalize a users location privacy requirements using a textit{location policy graph}, which is expressive and customizable. Second, we investigate how to satisfy an arbitrarily given location policy graph under adversarial knowledge. We find that a location policy graph may not always be viable and may suffer textit{location exposure} when the attacker knows the users mobility pattern. We propose efficient methods to detect location exposure and repair the policy graph with optimal utility. Third, we design a private location trace release framework that pipelines the detection of location exposure, policy graph repair, and private trajectory release with customizable and rigorous location privacy. Finally, we conduct experiments on real-world datasets to verify the effectiveness of the privacy-utility trade-off and the efficiency of the proposed algorithms.
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